The scope and schedule of our arms support is unclear:
Free Syrian Army (FSA) commander Salim Idriss told Reuters on Friday that rebels, who have suffered setbacks at the hands of Assad's forces in recent weeks, urgently needed anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, as well as a protective no-fly zone.
"But our friends in United States, they haven't told us yet that they are going to support us with weapons and ammunition," he said after meeting U.S. and European officials in Turkey.
A source in the Middle East familiar with U.S. dealings with the rebels has said planned arms supplies would include automatic weapons, light mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.
Light and heavy machine guns, 23mm anti-aircraft cannons, light mortars, light rockets, anti-tank rockets, and anti-tank mines would be of great help.
I'd hold off on anti-aircraft missiles unless we have ways to limit them in some way to keep them from being diverted to terror uses. For moral and practical reasons we don't want any to shoot down a civilian plane--even one deliberately placed in the line of fire.
Could we put batteries that run out in a couple weeks and can't be replaced? If so, we could risk sending some into rebel hands directly, even deep inside Syria.
Could we send in contractor or friendly special forces teams with anti-aircraft missiles?
Could we limit rebels holding such missiles to Jordanian and Turkish territory under watch by Jordanian or Turkish forces? The short range would severely limit their usefulness but they would at least protect small slices of Syria.
But the best way to help the rebels deal with Syrian air power is to help the rebels put the airfields under threat. Small numbers of truck-mounted (or towed) 120mm mortars would help with that in addition to the lighter rockets and mortars.
I just don't think Syrian air power is as decisive as is being made out to be. Rebels were doing better even when Syrian air power was more active. Rebel reverses have taken place not because air power has become better, but because Assad has more troops for the space he is trying to control.
Assad has abandoned the fight for large parts of Syria and has added tens of thousands of loyal militias and thousands of Hezbollah troops to make up for the loss of infantry in the fight over the last two years. The rebels need weapons to kill that new infantry. The militias are not well trained and the Hezbollah too few to take many casualties and remain effective. Kill them and the air power has nobody to support.
And without enough loyal troops to defend Assad's air bases, the rebels can push mortars and rockets within range of those air bases.
And even limited anti-aircraft missile capabilities (assisted by heavy machine guns and those 23mm systems) as I suggest might make Assad's pilots worried enough about rebel air defenses to fly too high to be effective in bombing missions, or cause the pilots to dump their bomb loads fast without regard to accuracy.
I'm not going to complain about our efforts. Yes, I wish we'd done this a year and a half ago. But I'm relieved President Obama has decided to fight a war whose outcome we have a great interest in. We hoped it would turn out well for us without our help. Now we know that no war is predetermined in its outcome. We can still do a lot going forward to defeat Assad and defeat Iran in Syria, without sending American combat brigades into Syria or American planes over Syria.
UPDATE: Rebels want heavier weapons and they claim they don't have much hope:
"We welcome the decision, but it is a late step. And if they send small arms, how can small arms make a difference?" said Louay al-Mokdad, political and media coordinator for the Free Syria Army. "They should help us with real weapons, antitank and antiaircraft, and with armored vehicles, training and a no-fly zone."
Some rebel leaders expressed doubt that any meaningful support would actually materialize.
"We have honestly lost hope," said Mosab Abu Qutada, a spokesman for the rebel military council in Damascus. "We were promised a lot before, and they never kept their promises."
I'm not aware that we've promised much before. That's been the heart of my complaints.
The rebel quoted brings up something I was going to bring up but didn't--Jordan has some older tanks in storage--Centurions and M-48A5s--whose 105mm guns could take on Syrian armor successfully. Train rebels in Jordan to use them, along with some heavy towed mortars, and rebels would have a potent force to start supporting their light infantry forces to carve out a free zone in the south.
Oh, and in the heavy weapons category, I'd throw in recoilless rifles as a combination anti-tank and light infantry support weapon. Surely we can scrounge up older 90mm or 106mm models that we used to build.
UPDATE: Even if we don't send heavier weapons, our allies in the Gulf will do so now. I forgot that aside in some article I read (in the Washington Post, perhaps). Also, I'm kind of shocked that Cordesman is advocating intervention:
The time has come for the United States to take decisive action in Syria. It cannot do so without running all of the risks that have existed since the crisis began. It cannot control all the arms it sends and some may fall into the hands terrorist and extremists. It cannot control the government that emerges if Bashar al-Assad falls. It cannot be sure that an extreme Sunni Islamist regime will not emerge that will be more of a threat to friendly Arab states and Israel than Assad and make the prospect of a war between Sunnis and Shi'ites/Alewites in the Islamic world even worse. The United States cannot count on winning UN support or Russian tolerance or having the same nations and voices that call for U.S. action today not being critics tomorrow.
But, there are times when the risks of inaction outweigh the very real risks of action. For all the talk of sarin and "redlines," the United States has far greater reasons for action than the scattered use of small amounts of chemical weapons that may have killed 140 people. In fact, the "discovery" that Syria used chemical weapons may well be a political ploy. It seems very like that the administration has had virtually all the same evidence for weeks if not months. The real reasons are the broader humanitarian issues involved and far more urgent U.S. strategic interests.
That's the thing. We have the war we have and not the war we wish we had. Syria is bleeding and our absence hasn't kept it from getting worse, now has it?
