The Marines are worried about being a "second army" and worried that a return to amphibious warfare roots (well, roots from the 1930s, anyway) is not the way to survive. But as a solution to their problem, this is just ridiculous:
So what should the Marine Corps do?
First, it needs to recognize that future wars will be very different. Firepower will be brought to bear by unmanned surveillance aircraft and by small, highly trained teams. These teams will be fast, exceptionally physically fit, able to operate independently, but also able to operate with larger forces when necessary. Teams will be inserted by parachute, landing zone, or over the horizon from the sea. They will be backed up by a robust logistics tail and continuous, round-the-clock air support that provides security to compensate for their small size. Air support will consist of fixed-wing assets at sea, national assets based around the world, and fleets of unmanned aircraft that constantly surveil each team and the area in which they operate. That means teams are unlikely to be surprised or ambushed, and when threats are identified, they can be quickly neutralized by precision munitions launched from drones, manned aircraft, and ships. The teams will be able to conduct precision operations and a variety of raids, or hundreds of operators can be employed in coordination with each other during high-intensity conflicts.
I'm not going to comment on this nonsense. I don't have to. I already did when Foreign Policy raised this notion three years ago, in an article called "The New Rules of War." Here it is.
Mind you, it covers a lot of terrain and the ratio of rant to dignified is rather high. The author of that older article and the notions presented just really push my buttons about stupidity masquerading as deep thinking.
On the firepower-centric capabilities of small units swarming around a conventional battlefield, I wrote:
Arquilla then makes the stunning leap that since swarms of insurgents stymie our massed armies (which they did not do in Iraq or Vietnam; and it is an error to think we were massed in either war) we should face massed enemy armies with swarms of our small units that overwhelm them by striking at many points. Wow. That is idiotic.
Again, Arquilla takes a valid point about naval warfare in a network centric world (something I agree with) and tries to apply it to ground warfare. ...
After not explaining how we'd use large numbers of small units to disable a conventional enemy army, Arquilla then says we could have that army of small units by slashing out the apparently useless armor, signal, artillery, MP, infantry, and assorted logistics units that a modern army needs to take the field. Yet somehow, we'd have to rotate those units in the face of a big enemy army. Just how do we do that when the enemy would control the ground? It is simply foolishness to extrapolate from a valid observation about carriers versus large numbers of smaller, networked missile-armed ships. And arguing that his reduction in forces could be done just as big reductions were made after 1945, 1975, and 1991 ignores that the earlier reductions did not eliminate the army and replace it with vast numbers of fire teams that apparently have no higher organization.
God almighty, once again some people think that magical Net Fairies will win our wars for us. Is the Marine Corps really so desperate to avoid sinking that they'll grasp at this anchor in the belief it will keep them afloat?
There's a difference between being visionary and just seeing things.
