Now this is what echelon above reality in academia means The soothing analysis under-estimates the proliferation that has taken place already. It ignores the reduced threshold of producing 70-year-old technology. And it ignores the changing environment that once made the cost-benefit analysis for producing nukes lean to relying on American for deterrence:
Since the dawn of the nuclear era, various leaders and analysts have predicted that nuclear proliferation would take place rapidly and inexorably. Those countries that could build the bomb would do so, and others would build it in response. It has been predicted that almost 50 countries would eventually join the nuclear club alongside the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
That prediction has proved wrong. Only four additional countries – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – have acquired nuclear weapons. One country unambiguously tried and was stopped (Iraq, before it was foolish enough to invade Kuwait). In each case, the reasons why these countries decided to build nuclear weapons had to do with the specifics of their security situations rather than a reflex action. This record is hardly cause for celebration but also hardly the proliferation threat so often forecast.
Moreover, neighbours were threatened when these countries acquired nuclear weapons but decided not to build nuclear weapons in response. Japan and South Korea did not build them after China and then North Korea did, despite chilling rhetoric from the one-party states that easily matched anything Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said about Israel. No Arab country built them after Israel did. Yes, Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, but no other country in the region has.
See? Nearly 68 years after we built and used the bomb, only four countries have developed the bomb. If you exclude the countries Russia, China, Britain, and France who are "recognized" nuclear powers. And if you don't count South Africa, which actually dismantled their program.
To be fair, I won't count Ukraine, Belarus, and Khazakstan who inherited nuclear weapons from the USSR when that empire broke apart, since they gave them up.
But for something sobering, our vote to go to war against Iraq after they invaded Kuwait was quite close in the Senate--despite the invasion and conquest being a clear violation of international law. So we came very close to having another nuclear state despite the post facto "foolishness" of Iraq invading Kuwait.
So in 68 years, 9 states--not four--developed nuclear weapons after we did. Or 8 if you assume--as I do--that North Korea doesn't quite yet have a nuclear weapon rather than a nuclear device that can be detonated under laboratory conditions. And not counting Iraq which was frighteningly close. But North Korea soon will if we don't halt them the way we inadvertently stopped Iraq. Still, one per decade on average is nothing to sneeze at.
And consider that the threshold to building a bomb has fallen from requiring the world's leading economic power in 1945 to being within the grasp of grass-eating, Third World, Hell holes.
So Arab countries haven't gone nuclear after Israel did? Well, perhaps the Arab states know that Israel really only wants nukes for national survival and don't intend to use them below that threshold. Perhaps the Arab countries that built chemical weapons arsenals figured that with a small state like Israel, chemical weapons were sufficient to devastate Israel without the expense of going nuclear.
And while the author admits that Pakistan went nuclear after India did, that is a major hit on his argument that nations don't go nuclear in reaction to others going nuclear. Actually, it is two hits on his theory, since India went nuclear mostly to counter China's growing threat to India. And it adds a third since Pakistan's quick passing of the nuclear threshold after India did meant that they anticipated India going past that point and didn't want to risk a lag. How many countries are watching potential enemies with exactly the same fear in mind?
The academic, in arguing that countries are more likely to rely on our nuclear umbrella for deterrence, also ignores that the specifics of security situations are changing dramatically from the situations where countries did not need to "reflexively" go nuclear when their enemies did and instead relied on America's nuclear umbrella.
Consider that for years China did not possess nuclear weapons capable of reaching America. Once enemies can reach America, confidence that we will risk New York City for their capital declines considerably. Consider that Britain and France are nuclear powers given that they had doubts that we would retaliate against the Soviet Union if the Soviets hit London or Paris but left America alone. If the USSR still had thousands of warheads, would we really attack Moscow rather than just hope to contain a nuclear exchange to Europe outside of the Soviet Union?
So our extended deterrence was easy to offer when all we had to do was deter states unable to hit us with nuclear weapons. Once North Korea and Iran have nuclear weapons that can reach American cities, other countries will have a serious question to answer--will we risk New York City to save Riyadh and Seoul? When those nuclear-armed regimes might be nuts enough to believe they can get away with nuking Seoul or Riyadh and not face nuclear retaliation consequences from an uninvolved third party?
Yes, China can reach our cities. But not the heart of our power in the east. And China knows we have so many more nuclear weapons that it really would be suicidal for China to initiate a nuclear war. And up until recently, China's conventional forces have had limited power projection capabilities. But this is changing. Our regional allies will soon have to wonder whether we would initiate a nuclear exchange to defend them if our conventional forces fail to defeat them.
I'm thinking that the specifics of the security situations of a lot of countries are going to change dramatically.
Oh, and just as more countries might need to rely on our nuclear weapons for deterrence, our president--who already received a Nobel Peace Prize for his promise in this area--clearly wants to reduce our nuclear arsenal to a minimal level for our own narrow deterrence needs.
So don't don't worry, be hopey.
Just remember that disclaimer, "past performance is no guarantee of future earnings." Can we really afford to assume past trends will continue forever?
I mean, all has been well up to now. What could go wrong?
