I never thought it was smart for Assad to commit his limited ground power to the fight for Aleppo. Now he seems to just be holding on to what he has there, and the rebels are applying pressure:
Troops loyal to President Bashar Assad and rebels have been locked in a deadly stalemate in Aleppo, Syria's largest urban center and main commercial hub, since an opposition assault last summer. Seven months later, the rebels hold large parts of the city and its outskirts, including several army bases, but they have been unable to overcome the regime's far superior firepower.
The capturing of the Sheik Said neighborhood, southeast of Aleppo, is a significant blow to regime forces because the area includes a major road, linking the northern city with the airport. The army has used the road to supply troops.
Syria's army is getting smaller and getting tired. If they don't get some relief soon, they'll break. I assume Assad is still bringing in recruits to train replacements, although I've never read anything about that. After all, hitting recruits as they train would be a logical (easier) target for the rebels. During the Iraq War, Iraqi trainees were hit enough times to make the news. So maybe Syria isn't having much luck recruiting new troops. Perhaps that is why Assad is forming militias of loyal Alawites. Perhaps that's why Iran is reported to be sending more people to Syria.
Israel, worried about chemical weapons and advanced weapons leaking out to Hezbollah, has already hit a convoy headed for Lebanon that is said to have had advanced anti-aircraft missiles. And Assad has had to respond--so far with words--to this attack to avoid looking too weak:
Assad said Syria is capable of facing current challenges and can "confront any aggression" that would target the Syrian people.
He might think he can gain some advantage with a limited direct clash with Israel:
[With] much of the army sitting out the fight because they aren't trustworthy enough to fight Sunni Arab rebels, might Assad try to get the army fighting on his side against Israel? Get them fighting for Assad for something acceptable, and maybe he can commit them to secondary tasks that support the loyal troops who fight the rebels.
Would this work? Could Assad order the army to engage Israeli troops along the Golan Heights in a limited engagement in order to rekindle a fighting spirit among his dispirited and questionable Sunni Arab troops?
I think it is too late to rally the Sunni Arabs around Assad by playing the Israel card. But could the army's morale be stiffened by having a foreign enemy? Or would the prospects of adding Israel as an enemy be more worrisome to the troops? It is risky, to be sure.
Or is Assad thinking about his ballistic missiles armed with chemical weapons? Because that is really the only other way for Syria to strike back. Otherwise, he'd have to count on either Iran going after Israel with terror attacks or Hezbollah restarting the rocket war against Israel. And Hezbollah is weakened by their commitment to Assad if Hezbollah has to defend against an Israeli ground invasion.
In any case, we can all be happy we didn't "militarize" the conflict as Secretary of State Clinton famously explained our reason for not trying to harm our clear enemy Assad by sending arms to rebels.
But wait. Somebody (who might have presidential ambitions in the future) may have clarified that refusal to arm the rebels:
A plan developed last summer by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then-CIA Director David Petraeus to arm and train Syrian rebels was rebuffed by the White House, The New York Times reported on Saturday.
We were worried about being drawn in and we didn't want jihadis to get arms. Well, we have to be poised to move in if the chemical weapons get loose, we have Patriot missiles defending Turkish cities, and the jihadis are not only getting weapons from Gulf Arab sources, but the jihadis are gaining influence among rebels as the most well-armed fighters. So we will have a new front against jihadis in Syria that might look like Yemen at best, if we help a friendly government--or maybe Somalia. We're on call to be drawn in under many scenarios.
From the start, while I didn't think we had to intervene directly, I didn't understand why arming the rebels wasn't a no-brainer. Assad funneled suicide bombers into Iraq, who killed thousands of Iraqis and hundreds of American troops; and was a sanctuary for Saddam's Baathist supporters after we drove Saddam from power. Even if the rebellion failed, we would have at least thrown a scare into Assad. Were we actually afraid Assad wouldn't talk to us if we tried and failed? When we were more than willing to talk despite Syria's failed attempt to help either the jihadis or Baathists win in Iraq?
Face it, American intervention doesn't automatically make things worse. If you are truly concerned just about casualties, we should have armed and supported Assad at the start to crush the rebellion 40- or 50-thousand casualties ago. But militarizing the struggle wasn't our choice, was it? Assad chose to treat protesters as enemies. And the protesters became rebels and responded in kind with increased capacity to fight over time.
Arming the rebels could have gained us some friends, diluted jihadi influence, and possibly accelerated the downfall of Assad. Seriously, were we afraid Assad would get mad at us? At the very least, we would have demonstrated to any enemy that we will take an opportunity to retaliate if it presents itself. Surely, that's not so bad, is it?
Often, there aren't a lot of good choices in foreign policy. I just ask for the least bad. I strongly suspect we did not choose the least-bad option in Syria.
