Strategypage looks at Mali:
About half the foreign terrorists were killed or quickly fled the country, but several hundred are still out there, planning a comeback. ...
France is using its air power, and reconnaissance aircraft, including additional ones from Britain and the U.S., to find the fleeing groups of al Qaeda men out in the desert and hit them with smart bombs. Hiding in the desert used to work, but now with photo and electronic reconnaissance aircraft (including UAVs) you can monitor large areas of desert and get a close look at anyone down there. If the Tuareg rebels agree to go after these al Qaeda remnants, that would be the end of the Islamic terrorist threat in northern Mali (not counting the drug smuggling, which will continue). If the Tuareg can be persuaded to make a deal with the government after that, the French will be able to leave. ...
So far French warplanes have carried out over 150 bombing attacks at about 30 targets. A growing number of American and French UAVs are in action, mainly for surveillance. There are currently about 4,000 French troops in Mali, about half of them special operations and other combat type forces. In most cases the Islamic radicals fled after being hit with smart bombs and before French ground troops arrived. There was some ground fighting in Konna and Gao, but it did not last long. Some prisoners were taken, but the senior people died or got away.
One, the key role of the Tuaregs in providing the manpower and intelligence to track down the jihadis is noted. I'll add that the post says that if the Tuaregs cooperate, the jihadis are doomed. This demonstrates two things:
First, there is a difference between insurgency and irregular warfare. If the Tuaregs side with the jihadis, it is insurgency because the jihadis are operating with the support of the local people. If the Tuaregs side with the French and Mali government, the jihadis are simply waging irregular warfare: avoiding decisive battle and raiding the government forces in small units, including planting mines, blowing up bridges, and rocketing bases.
Second, note that the assessment is that if the locals turn on the jihadis that the jihadis are toast. How different is this situation than Iraq where the terrorists and jihadis could count both on local supporters (Sunni Arabs and Shia Sadrists) and on friendly governments of Syria and Iran to funnel jihadis and supplies into Iraq. In northern Mali, no government is siding against the Mali government and moving the ingredients of terrorism into the region. Sure, some support can flow in from ungoverned spaced in surrounding states, but that is way different.
Two, half the jihadis are no longer in the field. Half were casualties or scattered. That's more vague than I'd like. Anybody scattered can regroup again. Or flee elsewhere to be a lethal threat in that location. Were half of those who were killed or who fled killed? Most? Just ten percent? It makes a difference.
I wonder just how many were killed given the statistics on bombing attacks--just 150. And against only 30 targets. Were the jihadis really conveniently massed together in tight road convoys to be killed? Could be, I admit. But I don't know. And if the French did take advantage of that sloppiness to really shatter half the jihadis in Mali, the survivors have learned not to group together--at least not without kittens or nuns in close proximity.
Also, the difference between senior leaders "dying" or "getting away" is rather huge, no? A rough estimate of those two categories would be convenient here, too.
Three, I did mention that our interest in Mali is very limited. We don't have a dog in the fight there, so it was perfectly appropriate to limit our support there. The Tuaregs aren't necessarily in the wrong, I wrote. And seeing reports of ill-trained Mali troops exacting revenge on the Tuaregs or anyone with lighter skin assumed to be a Tuareg rebel supporter show why our only interest was in smashing up the jihadis who flocked there. Hopefully, the Mali government and Tuaregs can come to an agreement on local autonomy that satisfied both sides and keeps them focused on killing jihadis rather than fighting each other.
So the French seem to have achieved more damage than I suspected from media reports with their small intervention force. But I can't really be sure what they achieved in regard to pounding al Qaeda even with the much better discussion of relevant information that Strategypage provides.
UPDATE: Already, jihadis rocketed Goa. But the French do claim to have killed several hundred jihadis in their intervention:
French and Malian troops are fighting Islamist rebels in the Sahara outside northern Mali's biggest town, France's defense minister said on Wednesday, describing the desert campaign against al Qaeda as a "real war" that was far from won. ...
France has said that several hundred Islamist fighters have been killed since it intervened In Mali on January 11 to turn back an Islamist column advancing south toward the capital.
The French are continuing operations against the jihadis. The Tuareg question--the key to winning the "real war" at this point--is still up in the air. The Mali government and their revenge-seeking ill-trained troops don't fill me with confidence thus far that the Tuaregs can be brought on board the anti-al Qaeda alliance despite the amazing ability of the jihadis to alienate the Tuaregs during their brief alliance in the spring.
