Get real:
At the same time, Washington is ringing China with an array of bilateral alliances and partnerships, all of which are more or less anti-China. It is not paranoid for Chinese to view this as a policy of military containment. When pressed on the containment question, U.S. policy officials offer absurd responses like that from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in June of last year. According to Panetta, the pivot “is not about containment of China.” Rather, Panetta stated, "it is about the challenge of humanitarian assistance and needs; the challenge of dealing with weapons of mass destruction that are proliferating throughout the world; and dealing with narco-trafficking, and dealing with piracy; and dealing with issues that relate to trade and how do we improve trade and how do we improve lines of communication."
Would any American accept such a rationale for China deploying 60 percent of PLAN assets to the Western Hemisphere? Dealing with humanitarian assistance and needs, stifling nuclear proliferation, suppressing narco-traffickers, and dispatching pirates do not require more than half the U.S. Navy. Even Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, knows this is nonsense: “When the administration says it’s not about China, it’s all about China. China knows this.” If the success of America’s Asia policy relies on Chinese elites believing our official rationale, the policy is in trouble.
Yes, the pivot is obviously about China. We know it and China knows is, and everyone else knows it. We just aren't rubbing their noses in it. It's called "diplomacy." So no, our success doesn't require China to believe the polite fiction we put out there.
Second, the "pivot" is more rhetorical than real. The shift of forces to the Pacific has been going on since the Cold War ended and the shift some years down the line will mean that 60% of our Navy will be in the Pacific rather than half during the Cold War. And our fleet is far smaller now than it was in the Cold War.
Third, that ring of bilateral alliances and partnerships have largely existed for the entire post-World War II period until today. This is nothing new. And our fleet has been out there for well over a century. Is it possible to ask what we'd do if China shifted 60% of their fleet to the Western hemisphere without acknowledging that China has never based any of their fleet here, so a similar decision is something entirely different?
He complains that our economic relations that boost China hinder an effort to contain China. Is he seriously saying we should wage economic warfare too rather than hope China will evolve as their economy grows, with our military pivot just an insurance policy in case they simply get more aggressive as they get more powerful?
Actually, since he is from Cato, I'm sure he just wants us to redeploy to Hawaii, Alaska, and American Samoa, and hope for the best. In twenty years Cato will explain how those territories aren't really ours and we should retreat to the 48 and hope for the best.
Oh, and this is a hoot:
The second major problem with the pivot is that instead of playing the role of offshore balancer, monitoring the balance in Asia and ensuring that no power militarily dominates the region, Washington insists on making China’s rise primarily about U.S.-China competition.
In what world does the author believe our pivot is about projecting a major American army ashore in Asia rather than remaining off shore? My complaint has been that Air-Sea Battle leaves out the Army. And adding "Land" to that strategy's name doesn't seem to have changed the basic assumptions.
The pivot is all about being an off-shore balancer, and the reality is that rising Chinese power is what is throwing the balance off--against the interests of our allies and against our interests. Who on God's Green Asia does this man think we should be balancing if not China? Laos? Didn't he just belittle Japan's efforts on defense?
Cato's strategy for every potential foe is to do nothing, fall back, leave them alone to do what they will, and hope that all turns out well in the end. Good God, they give me a headache.
