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Wednesday, December 26, 2012

I'm Not Even Sure What the Objective Is

Rebels in Syria make gains, the regime security apparatus shakes, and Russia complicates Western intervention. Is post-Syria Assad approaching? Just what defines victory and who defines it?

Rebels are clearing a safe zone in the north along the Turkish border in the northwest:

In northwestern Syria, rebels said they had wrested control of the town of Harem, on the border with Turkey, after months of fighting. In October, a Reuters photographer traveled with the rebels as they came under attack from government warplanes and snipers. The photographer witnessed ferocious street battles and scenes of brutality, including what appeared to be at least one summary execution of a government loyalist by armed rebels.

Amateur video posted on the Internet on Tuesday showed rebel fighters strolling through a medieval citadel in the town, gazing up at its stone arches. Government fighters, who had used the fortress as a base, had apparently departed in a hurry, leaving their bedding, pots and pans, a boot, and a helmet behind.

And another general defected:

"I am Major General Abdul Aziz Jassem al-Shallal, chief of the military police in Syria, I declare my defection from the regime's army because of its deviation of its fundamental mission to protect the nation and transformation into gangs of killing and destruction," the general said in a video aired by Al Arabiya.

Rumors of chemical weapons use by Assad's forces are unconfirmed, but there does seem to be a growing worry that Assad is starting to think of chemical weapons as just another tool to win, notwithstanding pledges not to use them (not that Assad admits to even having chemical weapons). Could Assad think limited use as a signal to the rebels would be too little to trigger Western intervention yet enough to cow the rebels?

And remember, failure by the West to intervene under those circumstances would encourage Assad to use chemicals more.

Yet Western intervention risks confrontation with Russian forces on the ground with the Syrian government's military forces:

Russian military advisers are manning some of Syria's more sophisticated air defences – something that would complicate any future US-led intervention, the Guardian has learned.

The advisers have been deployed with new surface-to-air systems and upgrades of old systems, which Moscow has supplied to the Assad regime since the Syrian revolution broke out 21 months ago.

Considering the first thing we'd do for any intervention is suppress Syrian air defenses (which includes blowing up lots of them), we'd likely kill Russians. Russia's military isn't a threat and they are unlikely to risk nuclear war over Assad, but who's willing to risk that?

This is why I have suggested that Russia could shield a rump Assad regime by deploying marines and paratroopers to a smaller Syria while abandoning the rest of Syria to rebels.

I wonder if a variation of retreating to a core Syria while retaining Damascus could be an agreement with the rebels to create a loose Syria with Sunni and Kurd areas becoming largely autonomous while leaving Assad in charge of the central government nominally in charge of all of Syria but only really ruling Damascus plus his own base of power? Would getting their own local governance be enough for the rebels if it ends the slaughter? Can they agree to let Assad survive? What would the jihadis do?

Russia would retain their naval base (such as it is) and a listening post in Syria and fulfill their pledge to defend their SOB no matter what. Yet it ends the fighting that is poisoning Russian relations with the Arab world. And perhaps it gives the West a headache to cope with the jihadis in outer Syria.

Or is it just a fight to the death at this point?