Ricks thinks that we don't fire generals the way we used to even as we have a zero-defects mindset that encourages caution:
The U.S. Army only seems impressive. Yes, it’s got plenty of tactically competent and physically heroic enlisted soldiers and low-ranking officers. But its generals are, on the whole, crappy, according to a new book that’s sure to spark teeth-gnashing within the Army.
That book is The Generals, the third book about the post-9/11 military by Tom Ricks, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and the Washington Post’s former chief military correspondent. Scheduled to be released on Tuesday, The Generals is a surprisingly scathing historical look into the unmaking of American generalship over six decades, culminating in what Ricks perceives as catastrophic failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The basic problem is that no one gets fired. Ricks points back to a system that the revered General George Marshall put into place during World War II: unsuccessful officers — defined very, very liberally — were rapidly sacked, especially on the front lines of Europe. Just as importantly, though, getting relieved of command didn’t end a general’s career.
Apparently, he's back to Iraq as
Regarding his new book on Army generals, I have to ask just what is surprising about a scathing critique of the Army from Ricks?
Second, comparing generals who are at division and above to Navy captains who command ships that run aground is unfair. We haven't fought a long conventional war since Korea. Those are the wars--like World War II in Ricks' example--where generals can be shown to fail in combat where maneuvering brigades, divisions, corps, and armies in battle are their trade.
Since Korea, our conventional campaigns have been brief and successful, whether you want to discuss the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the defeat of Saddam's regime in 2003, or the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. Who should have been fired during those brief, victorious conventional campaigns?
Once the last two wars became campaigns against insurgents and terrorists, the maneuvering of units goes down to squads, platoons, companies, and sometimes battalions. The generals will be in headquarters that don't move for years on end. The officers who will succeed or fail in obvious fashion will be lieutenants, captains, and majors, and lieutenant colonels--and strategic sergeants, too.
I'm reasonably certain that if we were in a large-scale conventional war that lasted many months, we'd fire generals and replace them.
Further, many captains are being fired for zipper-control issues arguably separate from fighting qualities. How does that support Ricks' fighting quality issue for Army generals?
Funny enough, despite his critique that we no longer fire generals but let them succeed elsewhere, he seems upset that General Casey was replaced by General Petraeus in Iraq yet allowed to keep working in the Army.
Our generals seemed to have done fine in winning our wars, adapting to get the win under conditions imposed by civilian leadership, whether you want to count Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. If civilian leadership doesn't make the effort to defend the wins once the gunfire fades away, that's not a problem of generalship.
I have questions about whether we are hurting our officer corps with a zero-defect mentality. But officers are always judged differently in peacetime (don't embarrass the Army or the government by making waves or mistakes) than in war time (win--and not too many casualties, please).
If our officers--arguably the best schooled and most combat experienced in the world, even if I'd never call them perfect--aren't ready to lead our troops into battle, my question is exactly what army does Ricks have in mind as having superior specimens of generals?
I wish Ricks would play to his strength and write books about how reporters can do a better job of reporting war and defense issues. I'm just not impressed with his strategic insight, which appears to be offering scathing critiques about the Army.
