I've noticed the increased Syrian use of air power recently. I didn't comment since it wasn't anything that new. I've mentioned that air power was being used instead of ground power; and that it couldn't last since the maintenance needs for air power are too much to sustain without outside help.
Interestingly enough, the air attacks were all in the west. To me, air power use only made sense if Assad used air power to keep rebels off balance in the east where Assad isn't doing more than passively holding bases and cities, while fighting to control the west. But Assad needs to use air power in the east as his ground forces erode.
What I never knew was just how much Syria was using air power. Strategypage finally answered my question:
Unable to halt, much less reverse, the rebel advances, the government has apparently ordered its air force to make maximum attacks on civilians who are supporting the rebels. The idea is that the civilians will cease sheltering and supplying the rebels in order to avoid more of this. On the 29th, the air force made its biggest daily effort ever, carrying out 60 attacks in 24 hours. Before that, the number of daily attacks had averaged 20 a day for and had stayed at that level for months. ...
The heavier air force effort has been going on for a week now and the warplanes are wearing out. Even transport helicopters are being used. These cannot use aircraft bombs so they drop improvised weapons (barrels full of explosives and scrap metal, or oil.) Many of these improvised bombs don’t explode and the scattered fragments tell the tale.
For an air force with a couple hundred helicopters and nearly 600 combat aircraft, 20 attacks per day is not much. A surge to 60 isn't much. I'm assuming that "attacks" means "sorties"--that is, one flight by one aircraft. We'd typically have planes flying multiple times in a single day, at least for a short period of time until planes and pilots start to wear out.
This level of effort in the air isn't enough to replace loss of ground power. Although to be fair, no amount is. Air power is great and can have a great impact on the ground, but it requires ground troops to exploit. In the end, air power makes ground power more effective and does not replace ground power (well, except for being able to replace ground artillery units).
One of the problems for Assad of lack of loyal ground forces is that supply lines are now being cut to loyalist bases:
The army also has problems getting around, mainly because the rebels control sections of the highway from Damascus (where the largest military bases, and supply stockpiles are) and Aleppo (the second largest city, with a population of 2.5 million). In particular the rebels took control of Maaret al Numan, in early October. This town is on the highway and the army has failed in at least three major attacks to get the rebels out. As long as the rebels block the highway, government troops in the northwest are facing a growing shortage of food, fuel, ammo and reinforcements. These shortages hurt morale and encourage more soldiers to desert. Those who remain begin to think surrender isn’t such a bad idea. Even some of the officers and NCOs are losing heart, and Basher Assad knows it.
More problems are evident on this score:
Syrian forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad have withdrawn from their last base near the northern town of Saraqeb, further weakening his ability to fight rebels in the country's largest city Aleppo, a violence monitoring group said on Friday.
Saraqeb straddles the junction of two main highways leading to Aleppo and the pullout will make it harder for government forces to reinforce or resupply Aleppo, where they have been battling with rebels for control since late July.
Much of Assad's immediate problem stems from the foolish decision to fight to hold Aleppo. The large city is a black hole sucking in scarce ground troops. The Syrians can't take the city, can't hold it even if they could take it, and can't supply it even if they could hold it.
The erosion of morale in surviving (and very tired) ground forces and the attrition in numbers of ground forces is making it more difficult for Assad to carry out a strategic withdrawal to a rump Syria of some size that is small enough for his forces to hold, while abandoning the rest of Syria to rebels.
The Russians are still willing to stand by their man, and have opposed our efforts to reorganize the rebel leadership:
Earlier this week, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed Moscow's rejection of calls for Assad's ouster, saying that it would only exacerbate the conflict. He said that he and other Russian diplomats have urged Syrian opposition groups to name their representatives for talks with the government.
Russia's backing is crucial if Assad is to pull off the difficult maneuver of truncating his state and pulling into a loyal redoubt. But like air power, Russian support is a force multiplier and not a replacement. Assad's long and foolish fight to hold too much ground is wrecking his ability to carry out a Plan B of regime survival.
UPDATE: Assad is trying to compensate for lack of troops by using air power, but it isn't working as the rebels gain ground; and if the rebels can start putting direct pressure on air bases, using ground forces to fight aircraft when they have to land and be prepared to fly, Assad will lose that edge, too:
Syrian rebels attacked a military airport in the country's north on Saturday in a push to cut off Syria's biggest city Aleppo from the capital Damascus, and secure a strategic north-south corridor.
President Bashar al-Assad's forces appear over-stretched with fewer fighters on the ground and have sought to limit rebel advances with far superior firepower, increasingly from the air and especially in the Aleppo and Damascus areas.
But despite ragged command-and-control and few heavy weapons, the rebels have gained control over the rural north and border crossings to Turkey after 19 months of conflict and now seek to isolate Aleppo from Assad's power fulcrum in Damascus.
It has been a major mistake by Assad to fight for Aleppo. His army is bleeding to death in the fight for the city.
