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Friday, November 16, 2012

Broken Shield

Australia aims to be the pivot point in our pivot to the Asia-Pacific region that spans the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Small but professional expeditionary forces will complement our larger forces. Australia also needs to be strong enough to provide a shield behind which we can rush to Australia's defense in a worst case scenario. Will Australia build that complement and shield?

In a world where defense budgets are under pressure amongst the good guys, will Australia carry out ambitious defense procurement plans to leverage American support?

Americans at many levels have voiced grave worries about our defence budget. Admiral Samuel Locklear, the US Pacific commander, in June expressed concern about the defence spend and hoped Canberra had "a long-term view" of military spending. In July, in an exclusive interview with me, former US deputy secretary of state Rich Armitage, honoured by the Gillard government with an Order of Australia, warned Canberra not to use the US "pivot" to Asia as an excuse for "a free ride" on US defence efforts.

Australia can get away with an inadequate defense budget if Australia is only a secure power projection platform for American forces in humanitarian or war missions. But if Australia becomes the front line, we will not rush our fleet and air force to Australia in a new Plan Orange to rescue the Philippines. Our Philippines shield was broken in 1941 and our sword was shattered, too, for that matter.

While we did return to the Philippines in 1944, Australia shouldn't count on it.

Look, I'm just speaking figuratively here, rather than literally predicting a Chinese invasion. Although a far weaker Japan contemplated that, and even without invasion could have put great pressure on Australia from their positions near Australia had we not intervened in the Southwest Pacific.

And if we, the Chinese, and the Australians all know that Australia couldn't hold long enough in the face of Chinese power for America to intervene, all three countries will eventually shift their policies.

We'll stop thinking about stopping China from threatening Australia, and perhaps without this rear area we'll have to abandon holding the line in the western Pacific. South of Japan, our first line of defense might be Guam in the Pacific Ocean and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

China will feel more free to push against neighbors from Taiwan to Indonesia and the South China Sea in between.

Being the weakest, Australia will likely find that Chinese pressure on Australia and America's inability to reach Australia in time will mean adjusting internal Australian policies as well as foreign policy to be more China-friendly.