Pages

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Thank God We Didn't Militarize Syria

Deaths in Syria rage at rates that match or exceed the toll in Iraq at its peak. Assad has lost control over much of the countryside and struggles to control the major cities. Thank goodness we refrained from sending arms to insurgents back in the spring or this thing might have gotten "militarized."

Remember when we refused to send arms to those fighting Syria because we didn't want to "militarize" the conflict? I do, quoting a news article here:

The rebels are badly outgunned by Syria's armed forces but the White House has said that it does not favour arming them, arguing that further "militarising" the conflict would worsen civilian bloodshed.

That never made any sense. It only made sense if the Obama administration assumed the rebels would lose and wanted to see if adversity would finally bring out the inner "reformer" in Bashar Assad. Otherwise, failing to arm the rebels just lengthened the war, increased the body count, and made the rebels less grateful for our help.

We should have jumped at the chance to harm an enemy of ours. Stick it to Assad and make coping with his fall part 2 of our thinking. In what world does it make sense to back his continued rule because he provides purported "stability?" Assad has a lot of American blood on his hands and he has earned our payback.

I never advocated invasion. But in what world does it make sense to refuse to exploit a weakness of an enemy to knock him down? Even if we failed to dislodge him, we'd have earned a little respect and maybe he'd be a little more cautious about crossing us in the future knowing we will look for weakness and strike when we find it.

Oh, and refusing to send arms to the opposition provided an opportunity for jihadis to jump into the fight:

The security services are concerned that the brutal conflict in Syria could become a "new Afghanistan" drawing in young men who return to Britain radicalised and keen to continue a fight to spread Islam.

A source said the numbers were "small but increasing" and there were concerns about "who they meet and the knowledge they could gain."

The "new Afghanistan" would mean the training ground that Afghanistan was in the 1990s prior to our 2001 invasion. Not many survived long enough to gain knowledge after that.

But Assad's forces are losing the war, so more jihadis will survive to spread their knowledge. Remember, we were afraid that if we sent arms we couldn't make sure jihadis didn't get them. Well, the jihadis got arms, anyway.

When you lead from behind, others jump to the front.

As always, I remain confused about whether this is the "smart" part of our diplomacy or the nuanced part.