Can't We All Just Get Along?

Normally, a revolt at the intersection of No and Where wouldn't attract much attention. The Tuaregs of northern Mali surely thought that they had it made when they ejected the southern-dominated Mali army from the north. Sadly for them, jihadis hijacked the secession and put No and Where on the map. The Tuaregs are having second thoughts about their future.

The Tuaregs, as I've noted before, seem willing to turn on the jihadis amongst them if they can cut a deal with the national government of Mali for more autonomy. They still want that deal:

Mali's main Tuareg rebel group said on Sunday it was no longer seeking to carve out a sovereign desert homeland, softening its stance as it seeks Western support to rout Islamists that have taken over the region.

In April the MNLA had declared an independent state in Mali's north called Azawad, days after a coup in Mali's southern capital Bamako, but Al Qaeda-linked Islamists later hijacked the rebellion and took control of the vast territory.

Western and regional powers are now mulling military intervention to retake the zone amid fears an Islamist safe haven could destabilize the region, and MNLA is aggressively seeking backing for a role in the effort.

I'd think that the apparent link between the jihadis and the Benghazi consulate attack give the Tuaregs more incentive to cut a deal before we decide we'd like to hammer the region to kill jihadis.

We have no real interest in maintaining the borders of Mali, but a parallel campaign fought by Mali, ECOWAS, and the French to regain the north for Mali would be a Tuareg defeat despite our relative disinterest in that issue.

We'll see if a Tuareg Awakening can be nurtured by French and American special forces with the cooperation of the Mali government to restore at least some government authority in the north.