East Africa figured prominently in al-Qaida's strategic plans. In the late 1990s, al-Qaida's "Africa Corps" planted terror cells throughout the region. They were responsible for the August 1998 terror strikes on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Al-Qaida's leaders saw Kenya and Uganda as weak "Black African" nations susceptible to al-Qaida's version of "Islamization." Their corrupt governments, plagued by tribal rivalries, were easy targets for political subversion, and their Muslim citizens were potential recruits. Ethnicity is a sensitive subject, but ethnic prejudice, and centuries of Arab slaving in East Africa, shaped al-Qaida's assessment.
Yet today, in Somalia, these "weak" nations are actively defending their own interests using their own expeditionary military forces. These forces have a solid record for defeating al-Shabab fanatics in both urban and desert operations. The Kenyan and Ugandan military officer corps are increasingly professional. Both nations have improved their counterterror capabilities. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda know how to share intelligence among themselves and use intelligence provided by the U.S.
The Long War has many fronts. Many are quiet. Somalia doesn't get a lot of attention. But by training, coordinating, and doing favors, we've organized a coalition of the willing in the Horn of Africa. Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, and maybe Ethiopia are doing a lot of harm to jihadis in Somalia. Our forces are quietly involved.
Kudos to both the Bush and Obama administrations for working this problem for so long. We can win, lose, or "responsibly end" campaigns around the world, but the Long War goes on.
