But Afghans are willing to resist the Taliban even when we aren't around. Winning hearts and minds doesn't mean that all the people have to love everything we love--just have a common enemy we can both fight. This article recounts incidents of local resistance that I noted in an update to that post I first linked to above:
[Excitement] has grown since reports emerged earlier this summer of clashes between villagers and the Taliban in Andar district in Ghazni province, south of the capital. Confrontations had happened before, but the scale and duration of what is taking place in Andar is unusual. In an all-out war, the Taliban were driven from villages, with fatalities on both sides. When the Taliban tried to counterattack, the locals successfully resisted.
These forces have to be the first line of defense in defeating the Taliban. Not all security forces need to be special forces. You need armed civilians willing to defend their homes and report on Taliban movement; you need organized militias with the ability to call for help if they face forces they can't handle; you need full time police with more numbers and equipment to be on watch and patrol all the time; you need regulars who can be called in when firepower and training are needed to bolster numbers; and you need--for a while longer--US forces as the ultimate hammer.
On top of all that you need air power for killing and surveillance that hopefully can preempt attacks and help to atomize enemy formations in addition to their ability to react to enemy attacks in progress or assist in pursuit when the enemy retreats.
Each layer of ground forces handles what it can, but calls for a higher level of force when it can't handle what it faces.
Even here we are familiar with this ring of concentric defenses: armed individuals in their own home; private security guards guarding businesses; neighborhood watches on local patrol; local police forces and county sheriffs; local SWAT teams; state police; National Guard; and federal armed forces. All this, and we're at peace.
We did more when we had to. How many Westerns have you watched where a frontier sheriff rounds up a posse of armed civilians to track down a criminal or gang too tough to handle by the sheriff and regular deputies alone? Heck, how many of you are in your state's unorganized militia and don't even realize it?
We have to work with the Afghan local forces that have our common enemy rather than try to force them into a national government template (From The Economist article):
The progress of Mr Kamrani and his comrades is being closely watched from the capital. Just because they are fighting the Taliban does not mean they are friends of Mr Karzai, still less of NATO. Many villagers say they are sickened by the corruption and injustices of the Kabul regime. They just want to be left alone.
The central government of Afghanistan isn't capable of organizing and paying for defenses everywhere; and the locals have little love for that distant alien Kabul elite. We shouldn't try to make that unworkable solution to the insurgencies and drug gangs work.
Before the various surges in Afghanistan really took off, I called for emphasizing local points of government rather than trying to create a nation where none exists:
The end result in Afghanistan, if all goes well, will be a nominal national government that controls the capital region and reigns but does not rule local tribes and which actually helps the locals a bit rather than sucking resources from the locals, who in turn do not make trouble for the central government or allow their areas to be used by jihadis to plan attacks on the West. We press for reasonable economic opportunities, with bribes all around (I mean, foreign aid), to keep a fragile peace.
And we stick around this time, unlike after the Soviets left Afghanistan when we ignored the place, for a generation or two to see if we can move Afghanistan into the 19th century (hey, let's not get ahead of ourselves).
I know I've quoted that portion of that post a lot, but it bears repeating.
We need to get involved with these people who resist the Taliban. Special forces need to be on the ground with them to get a feel for them, provide access to air power and reinforcements, and otherwise monitor them.
Militias are a tool to defeat insurgents, but they can also turn on you if they insist on continuing after they are no longer needed. Remember, early in the Iraq War, I counted Shia militias as part of the government order of battle because they defended their neighborhoods against Baathist and al Qaeda attacks. Eventually, these Sadrists became threats to the government of Iraq and had to be fought by US and Iraqi forces. But that doesn't erase the fact that they were useful--and perhaps irreplaceable--at first.
So take advantage of these people who would fight our common enemy. They are the first line of defense, and we can't waste them or risk them being intimidated into ignoring or aiding the enemy presence around them. Aid them. Work with them. And monitor them very carefully to watch for signs that they are changing from being an asset to a liability.
