Whether it was Allied forces taking over V-1 launching sites along the Channel or Japanese forces taking over airfields in China, the best way to stop attacks from the air is to take over the enemy launching areas. So Hezbollah should be careful making threats like this:
The Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah said on Friday it possessed what it called precision rockets that could kill "tens of thousands" of Israelis in strikes on Israel.
One Israeli official said that he thinks that an Israeli attack on Iran would result in a month-long war. This clearly means a month of enduring Hezbollah rocket attacks, for the most part, rather than a month-long Israeli campaign against Iranian targets.
Yet this doesn't mean that after a month that Hezbollah tires of killing Jews or runs out of rockets. I think it means that Israel anticipates it will need a month to occupy southern Lebanon to eliminate the launching points for Hezbollah's rocket arsenal.
Indeed, I think that Israel goes north in a deep penetration to really tear up Hezbollah's infrastructure and to kill or capture their leaders and important personnel. The Israelis won't stop until they hold Baalbek.
Hezbollah may be operating under a couple delusions. One, they may think that their credible performance in 2006 was caused by their own skills in ground fighting rather than Israel's poor decisions about how to fight that war.
Two, Hezbollah may be forgetting that reinforcements will not be coming from Syria when the Israelis move. Even if Assad wanted to send troops to help Hezbollah, he can't. Assad is having trouble slowing down his rate of defeat in his own fight.
So Hezbollah is on its own.
As an aside, did anyone really believe that the United Nations would solve the problem of southern Lebanon being used by a sub-state actor to attack Israel in 2006?
Whether or not an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities works, Hezbollah is going to experience a month-long world of hurt if it carries through with its threat to fight at Iran's side.
UPDATE: Worse for Hezbollah, the Lebanese might not care if Hezbollah gets hammered:
Not long ago, Arabs everywhere listened when the leader of Hezbollah spoke. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah's prominence, bolstered by his Lebanese guerrilla force's battles against Israel, was a sign of the rising regional influence of Shiite Muslims and overwhelmingly Shiite Iran. Now, his speeches don't necessarily make front pages even in Lebanon.
Hezbollah might want to reconsider making threats.
UPDATE: More on why Iran's proxies might not really be too eager to go to bat for Iran in case Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities:
[The leader of Iran’s Supreme National Security Counci, Saeed] Jalili’s visit [to Lebanon and Syria] was meant to remind the Israelis that Iran’s proxies on Israel’s northern doorstep remain ready and willing to plunge the region into chaos if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities.
It appears however, that Iran’s allies in the eastern Mediterranean may not be as keen about going to war for the ayatollahs as Tehran would like – and the Israelis know it.
We've seen that Iranian attempts to strike back over cyber attacks and the killing of scientists related to their nuclear program have not been terribly professional or effective. Iran needs these proxies for a good terror counter-attack, and Iran doesn't have them now.
The article concludes with a warning to Israel:
Netanyahu seems willing to go down in history as the prime minister who saved [Israel] from a nuclear Iran. And he’s counting on minimal retaliation from Iran’s proxies if Israel strikes first. But as Barbara Tuchman, the World War I historian, once said, “war is the unfolding of miscalculations.”
True enough. Plans don't survive first contact with the enemy, and all.
But that warning applies to all the combatants. Let's remember Grant's frustration with his generals in the Army of the Potomac who feared General Lee's formidable skills:
Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.
And it applies to decisions that avoid the close war for the distant--and perhaps nuclear--war.
