Assad has effectively abandoned all but crucial outposts in the east in order to storm Aleppo:
From fortified outposts in the crude-producing desert near Iraq, government forces have been shelling Deir al-Zor, an impoverished Sunni Muslim city on the banks of the Euphrates that anchors a vast, arid region bordering Iraq.
But core loyalist troops, drawn mostly from Assad's minority Alawite sect, are locked primarily into what is shaping up to be a protracted battle for Aleppo, as well as in shoring up an uncertain grip over the capital Damascus.
In the process, Assad faces the specter of Deir al-Zor province slipping out of his orbit and with it Syria's 200,000 barrel-a-day oil output, military experts and diplomats say.
This fits with other reports.
Early on, I speculated that Assad would need to retreat to the west to match his territory with the capabilities of his army to defend, hold only strategic outposts in the east, and build a larger army capable of eventually moving east to relieve the outposts and then pacify the entire country.
But Aleppo is too big to be in the smaller perimeter of a Core Syria. And trying to fight for it is forcing Assad to abandon eastern Syria. Trying to hold the city will force Assad to abandon a lot more, too, and prevent him from holding a Core Syria that allows him to continue to call his realm "Syria." He's guaranteeing he'll need to retreat to the Alawite mini-state and concede the UN seat to whoever takes Damascus.
Of course, my early thoughts on a path to victory for Assad no longer apply. I now think Assad's military is too battered and worn out to temporarily abandon huge tracts of land. Assad has to cut his losses and hold what he can with the forces he has. Pretending all is well is not a productive option.
Assad has to fight this war with the army he has and not the army he wishes he had. That means he will not rule the country he wishes he could hold--just the country he can hold.
