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Thursday, July 12, 2012

What About East Syria?

Stratfor writes about the implications of a Sunni Arab-run Syria if Assad falls. It is an interesting piece.

But I wonder if the discussion shouldn't be whether Assad wins or the Sunni opposition wins. What if Assad retreats to regions he can hold in the west and simply leaves eastern Syria for the resistance to fight over?

I've discussed the option since then, and still wonder about the degree of difficulty in moving critical regime support pieces (loyal people, strategic weapons) into the area to be held. Originally, I wondered if Assad would try to hold outposts in the east in areas too critical to abandon. But that may imply corridors. And holding those outposts would be very expensive and perhaps take too many troops.

In the end, if Assad wants to survive by retreating to a mostly Alawite Core Syria, he'll have to abandon (and destroy) anything in the east that he can't move west. That will be a monumental chore.

Would Russia and China replace what can't be moved? Would Iran help? Would the morale of the Alawites and perhaps their Christian and Druze allies survive such a retreat long enough to make a go of a Core Syria? Would Russian troop presence on the ground provide a bridge for the Alawite leadership to get used to the new situation and become determined to hold their smaller state?

Would Turkey consider lopping off half of Syria's population and a majority of the land a victory enough over Assad? It would be easier to get UN approval for relief efforts in East Syria alone.

Then we'll need to figure out the implications of a Sunni Arab-run East Syria (and wonder how many states emerge and under whose control) as well as what a Core Syria running from the Turkish border to the Jordanian border would do.