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Wednesday, April 18, 2012

No Reason to Be Complacent

I noted this article earlier and figured I should comment more on the theme that China's armed forces have some deficiencies that will make them less effective in war time. The article concludes:

Few analysts believe the PLA can seriously tackle its own corruption problems without decisive intervention from the civilian leadership. Whether Hu or his likely successor Xi will have the political capital to spend remains an open question. And if the PLA is the malignant morass of theft, bribery, extortion and mistrust that Liu and other well-placed princelings say it is, then China's military offensive capabilities must be lower than many overseas strategists fear. "The impact of corruption on the PLA's war-fighting capabilities is likely to be serious," said Tai Ming Cheung, a China security expert at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego.

Behind the PLA's shiny exterior is a world where information is not trusted, major decisions require cumbersome bureaucratic consensus, and leaders fear their subordinates will evade responsibility or ignore directions. This entails a different array of risks than the ones that have troubled China's neighbors and the United States. And Liu, like several other active princelings, is not sure whether the PLA is capable of self-surgery in the age beyond ideals and strong leaders. "We are falling like a landslide!" Liu said in one of his speeches. "If there really was a war," he asked his subordinates, "who would listen to your commands or risk their life for you?"

I have a few things to say about that.

One, all militaries have weaknesses. I never assumed China was exempt from that truism, any more than we are exempt.

Two, if the Chinese still pay attention to Sun Tzu, they will pretend to be weak so we will grow arrogant, as Sun Tzu advised. So I don't assume that statements by Chinese leaders that we can see are the true state of China's military.

Three, it is a mistake to draw the conclusion from Chinese weakness that exists that we are superior to the Chinese and so we cannot be beaten.

The reason that third point is a mistake is because the Chinese don't have to defeat us in battle to defeat us in war. All China has to do to beat us is to defeat the Taiwanese in war.

And to defeat the Taiwanese in war, China has to be better than the Taiwanese--not better than us. All China has to do in regard to us is to delay our intervention long enough to defeat the Taiwanese. Our president might still be insisting that "all options are on the table" while Chinese forces are rubbing out the last resistance in Taipei.

Let me leave you with another quote from Sun Tzu:

The value of time--that is, being a little ahead of our opponent--has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.

People, if the Chinese know we are far better soldiers than they are, they'll try to defeat us--quickly--by striking someone they can defeat. Does Taiwan have either numerical superiority or nicely calculated commissariat support? Worse, China might not even really believe we are better than them. Even worse, we might not be better than them (at least not better enough to make all other factors irrelevant).

Don't get arrogant, people. Respect our potential foes. And plan how we'll defeat them.