In fall 2009, when President Obama decided to surge 30,000 more US troops to Afghanistan, I was already worried about the supply lines to our troops. I thought the 68,000 already committed to Afghanistan could win--if we didn't try to create a functioning democracy with a strong central government (my objectives for Afghanistan have never been high). And I worried about having even more troops in Afghanistan when our supply lines ran through Pakistan or Russia.
My hopes have always been that a surge of forces could knock down the Taliban enough for a strengthened Afghan security establishment (national and local) could hold their ground. And then we could reduce our forces to a modest level with aircraft, special forces, and a ground brigade that would be a strategic reserve for the Afghans. At worst, we could use aerial resupply alone for such a force.
So even when our last surge force started to come home, I didn't oppose the reduction--I just worried about the optics of pulling them out too quickly would look like a retreat to friends, enemies, and neutrals. What's the difference if our troops linger a bit longer to fight another season to knock down the Taliban more thoroughly in the east? Would half a year more in place really kill us?
But maybe it would. I have to wonder about what kind of briefings that President Obama could be getting about the urgency of getting our troop levels down sooner rather than later:
At the end of 2011, it seemed that Russia was going to threaten to cut off the NDN to compel United States to change its position on BMD. But then something occurred that could give the United States more leverage against the Kremlin: Russian protests. In the lead-up to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's planned return to the presidency in March, Russia's political landscape has been rocked by instability.
I have to admit that if I was president, I'd be very worried about the safety of our troops in landlocked Afghanistan with Pakistan acting all loopy about our supply lines and Russia determined to hurt us by cutting our alternate supply lines (the Northern Distribution Network: NDN) even if in the long run failure to defeat jihadis in Afghanistan would blow back into Central Asia and Russia itself. It may be that we really do need to get our troops out sooner rather than later. So I'm unwilling to hammer the administration over their decisions here, since I've long been worried about our supply lines and I don't know what the president is being told about the security of our supply lines.
This does open up a line of criticism about the so-called "reset" with Russia given that Russia is willing to allow our troops to be killed to thwart of ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in Europe. But that's another question. And even there I'll admit that there can be a justification for a policy of appeasement--for a while--to buy time to win in Afghanistan. It only becomes a problem if it is a way of life rather than a ploy to buy time that you use to prepare for a fight that you'd lose if it comes sooner rather than later.
Just because I don't care for the Obama administration's foreign policy in general doesn't mean I don't appreciate the many balls Obama has to keep in the air at once to achieve our global goals. I remain grateful that on some national security issues he has been capable of learning that reality doesn't correspond to the left wing beliefs he absorbed from our so-called "reality based community," but I'd be happier if he didn't start from the wrong position to begin with. You wage war with the president you have and not the president you wish you had, eh?
In the end, I suspect that President Obama is getting some sobering briefings about our supply lines to Afghanistan. Perhaps our withdrawal pace really is all about politics and the 2012 election, but I cringe from assuming our president would play with matters of war and peace in such a matter. I hope I'm not naive. If there weren't obviously political decisions in defiance of national interests ...
