For Want of a Nail

Iran's ability to cause problems inside Iraq is only one reason we should have maintained a robust presence in Iraq (25,000, I'd say, although if the military could maintain 3 combat brigades plus special forces sufficient to fight, I'll trust a lower number they provide). It is such a small commitment and sacrifice on top of what we've already invested that I am shocked that the administration is fine with walking away--and even defending this failure by blaming Iraq's leadership.

Other problems include the Kurdish-Arab divide that our presence has kept from exploding:

A tense standoff between local police and the Iraqi Army played out on Thursday at the gate of the U.S. airbase in the northern city of Kirkuk, where a dispute over land and oil threatens national stability and unity as U.S. forces withdraw.

The territorial conflict, between the central government in Baghdad and the semiautonomous Kurdistan region, is just one flashpoint that some American and Iraqi officials say could boil over after the full pullout of U.S. troops at the end of December.

And our departure will give more room for al Qaeda and the Baathists to reconstitute:

Asadi said the al Qaeda-tied group Islamic State of Iraq and banned Baathists posed the biggest security challenge with the U.S. withdrawal, while other outlawed groups are expected to fade away.

Asadi said intelligence showed most suicide attacks that have been thwarted in recent weeks were planned, funded and logistically supported by the Iraqi Baath Party now based in Syria, but carried out using al Qaeda fighters.

After the U.S. invasion, neighboring Syria became a base for insurgents who slipped across the porous frontier to attack American troops in Iraq.

"The Baath Party is using al Qaeda, using the Islamic State of Iraq, and the logistics, finance, and intelligence is the Baath Party's part of the mission," he said.

Remember that mostly defeated isn't the same as defeated. The Taliban mostly defeated the Northern Alliance but after 9/11 we were able to assist the remnant Northern Alliance and leverage their forces into a drive on Kabul that drove the Taliban from power.

Perhaps the Iraqi government is still strong enough to defeat these players, but there sure are a lot to deal with. The Obama administration may think that at worst the fall of Iraq's government will take so long that there will be a decent interval between our departure and enemy victory. But there will be no doubt about who sowed the seeds of defeat if they sprout even after the end of the second Obama term.