And in Asia, the rise of democratic India and communist China following the rise of friendly and prosperous democracies in Japan, South Korea, and Japan, in particular, means that our military focus naturally has to swing to China's potential to upset the prosperity of the region rather than simply join it. Regardless of China's intent (which seems troubling), their growing capabilities call for caution.
So increased military cooperation between India, Australia, and America makes sense.
This paper recommends that the U.S., Australia, and India pursue a formal trilateral dialogue to complement the new U.S.–Japan–India trilateral dialogue, the ongoing U.S.–Japan–Australia dialogue, and the web of bilateral declarations and talks. Forging separate trilateral tracks of dialogues will facilitate coordination among the four nations while they remain focused on the specific dynamics of each triad. It will also provide a basis for eventually reestablishing an official quadrilateral dialogue in the event political circumstances in the region suit its revival. Integrating economic, political, and security relationships among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India will bolster the collective security of all four countries.
The paper avoids looking like an anti-china alliance by keeping Japan in a separate box with America, relying on America to coordinate the Pacific and Indian Ocean tracks in both groupings.
When our relative power is diminishing, we need to be able to shift naval forces between the Indian Ocean (all the way to East Africa and the Persian Gulf) and the Pacific (all the way to Japan and South Korea). Australia fits the bill as a safe staging area (along with Singapore closer to the "front"). I noted this earlier this year.
China will see this as an anti-China coalition. But it really isn't. It just wants to defend the stability and prosperity that we all have built. If China joins that prosperity without disrupting it, we'll welcome them. But we don't know if China seeks to join the system or simply use it to increase their ability to challenge it.
Participating in such groupings increases the efficiency of our power projection in an era of declining asset relative to potential opponents and encourages regional states to cooperate with us. As much as I worry that countries in region will distance themselves from America out of fear that we cannot or will not oppose China if they turn to the dark side of power, if the weak Philippines still has enough confidence in us to defy China, we're still doing OK:
Tensions are rising again as China and the Philippines bump boats and trade diplomatic barbs over the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Adding fuel to the fire were recent "war games" staged by 3,000 American and Filipino marines near the hotly disputed maritime territory.
Even as we look at drawing down in the Central Command area over the next five years, our interests will not draw down. Even as we focus more on the western Pacific, we need the capacity to shift smaller numbers of naval forces between the Indian and Pacific oceans.
