Well, addressing it should be point by point, I suppose. He first says war is inevitable:
"Absent a good faith attempt to negotiate this thicket of disputes between China and Taiwan and the Philippines and Brunei and others, I think [war between America and China is] inevitable," he says. "The Chinese are not going to back down."
So China wants the South China Sea and unless we back down China will fight to get their expansive and unprecedented interpretation of international law it will be our fault for resisting China and helping other nations contesting China's claims?
It's almost like restating his position to clarify it eliminates the need to refute it.
Next:
Just as America adopted the Monroe Doctrine to project power in the Western Hemisphere, the Chinese believe they have a right to their own sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific region. "China is after all a 3000-year old country; Asia has been throughout most of that history Sino-centric," he says.
Well, as long as China has been "Sino-centric" and bossing around its neighbors for 3,000 years, it is OK now. Silly me.
Question: Since the author justifies China's view of their natural dominance based on our Monroe Doctrine, does that mean we have the right to claim the Gulf of Mexico as our territorial waters and to tell all of Latin America to modify their policies to fit our desires? Someone needs to break the news to Castro and Hugo. Or do we have to wait for a a decade or a dozen for this right to kick in?
Also, he does realize that the Monroe Doctrine was about keeping Europeans from interfering in their former colonies, right? It wasn't about reimposing our own hegemony that we'd long exercised but lost. He understands that difference, right?
Let's move on. It's bound to get better, shouldn't it? He is a subject matter expert. So:
But to those who believe the U.S. and its allies must "bottle up" China, Glain says "there's nothing in those 3000 years of Chinese history" to suggest China's intentions are to militarily dominate the region. "On the contrary, they've always remained close to their own territory," he notes. "They have always been the Middle Kingdom between heaven and earth."
For real? The Chinese believe they are the middle kingdom between heaven and earth so their dominance is justifiable?
The man is arguing that China has dominated their region since long before we were around. Is he saying that the other people of the region went along with the whole heaven thing and China's sheer size and military power had nothing to do with China's dominance of the region for so long?
Let me consult my Dictionary of Wars index under China. I'll skip the civil wars. Check this out starting at page 631. (I started to type from my paper copy but quickly got tired.) Let's start in 111 B.C. and continue to 1661 before Europeans started to dominate the area, interrupting China's long history of doing whatever they wanted despite what neighbors might want. I've cut out the rebellions and civil wars. I could have mixed some up since I'm going by index entry for the most part. Although I do hate to leave out the "Red Eyebrow" Rebellion.
--Chinese Conquest of Nam Viet (111 B.C.E.)
--Chinese-Cham War of 431–446 C.E.
--Chinese-Cham War of 605 C.E.
--Sino-Korean War of 610–614 C.E.
--Chinese War against the Eastern Turks (629–630 C.E.)
--Sino-Tibetan War of 641 C.E.
--Chinese War against the Western Turks, First (641–648 C.E.)
--Sino-Korean War of 645–647 C.E.
--Sino-Indian War of 648–649 C.E.
--Chinese War against the Western Turks, Second (657–659 C.E.)
--Sino-Korean War of 660–668 C.E.
--Chinese War with Nanchao (751–774 C.E.)
--Sino-Tibetan War of 763–821 C.E.
--Chinese-Annamese War of 907–939 C.E.
--Chinese War with the Khitans (979–1004 C.E.)
--Chinese War with the Tanguts, First (990–1003 C.E.)
--Chinese War with the Tanguts, Second (1040–43)
--Chinese-Annamese War of 1057–61
--Chinese-Annamese War of 1075–79
--Juchen Mongol Conquest of Liao (1114–22)
--Juchen Mongol Invasion of the Sung Empire (1125–62)
--Genghis Khan, Conquests of (1190–1227)
--Genghis Khan’s First War with the Hsia Empire (1206–09)
--Mongol Conquests (1206–1405)
--Genghis Khan’s War with the Chin Empire (1211–15)
--Genghis Khan’s Sack of Peking (1215)
--Mongol-Persian War, First (1218–21)
--Mongol Invasions of India (1221–1398)
--Kalka River, Battle of the (1223)
--Genghis Khan’s Second War with the Hsia Empire (1226–27)
--Mongol-Persian War, Second (1230–43)
--Mongol Conquest of the Chin Empire (1231–34)
--Mongol Invasions of Korea (1231–41)
--Mongol Conquest of the Sung Empire (1234–79)
--Vietnamese-Mongol War of 1257–88
--Mongol Invasion of Japan, First (1274)
--Mongol-Burmese War of 1277–87
--Mongol Invasion of Japan, Second (1281)
--Mongol-Burmese War of 1299–1300
--Mongol-Chinese War of 1356–68
--Vietnamese-Chinese War of 1405–07
--Vietnamese-Chinese War of 1418–28
--Burmese-Chinese War of 1438–46
--Manchu Conquest of China (1618–50)
--Manchu Conquest of Korea (1627)
--Chinese War with Koxinga (1646–62)
--Burmese-Chinese War of 1658–61
OK, including the Mongols who conquered China may seem unfair, but they were absorbed into Chinese culture, after all, and became China's ruling elite. So what the Mongols did has to count.
Besides, the Mongols also inconveniently show that neighbors didn't always just do what China wanted and that China is not unbeatable. Those Mongol guys successfully took over China.
Still, there are 47 wars with neighbors over 17 centuries (I don't know what the author looked at for the previous 13). Sure, it only sounds like a lot since it is a long span of time. But that's still close to 3 wars per century for a country that the expert says didn't need to fight to gain dominance. And remember, I didn't count the civil wars that in a continent-sized country would have been wars had they been broken up like Europe.
Let's just gloss over the expert's missing the point that we wouldn't have to bottle up China (with the eager cooperation of neighbors who still don't get that Heaven mandate thing) if China wasn't trying to bully their way to taking what isn't theirs.
How about another claim?
However, Glain fears the U.S. and its allies might provoke China into a war that might otherwise be avoidable. "Arms races tend to develop their own immutable momentum," he says, noting the Pentagon is embarking on an "enormous military buildup" in the region.
An "enormous" military build up in the region by America? Is he for real?
Let's look at my IISS Military Balance editions from 2000 and 2008. The data wasn't fully compatible for comparison so I'll stick with American forces based in Japan, South Korea, and Guam, which are in the region. I was going to include Alaska and Hawaii to be generous, but they are American states so maybe that wouldn't be appropriate anyway.
In 2000, in Japan, we had a total of 40,100 military personnel, including 19,000 Marines in one Marine Expeditionary Force (not a "Marine Expeditionary Unit, as the expert stated--a MEU is less than 2,000 and is a reinforced battalion-size unit.) It had two regiments. We also had one aircraft carrier and 6 surface combatants based there.
In 2008, we had 43,000, including 13,000 Marines (only one regiment). We had 1 aircraft carrier and 10 principal surface combatants.
So I'll give the expert credit on this based on an increase of 3,000.
Now to South Korea.
In 2000, we had 36,500. That included two Army mechanized brigades.
In 2008, we had 27,000, including one Army mechanized brigade.
What Japan giveth, South Korea taketh away. Minus 9,500.
That's a net decline of 6,500 in the "enormous" build up of forces in the region for those of you at home keeping count.
Finally, tiny Guam. It's our territory, but no matter. Let's count our forces there.
In 2000, we had fewer than 4,000 military personnel.
In 2008, we had 2,800.
So subtract 1,200 over the period.
We have a net loss of 7,700 American troops in the region over the period 2000-2008.
Now, I admit that eventually the Marine regiment that departed Japan is supposed to move to Guam. So we could say that Guam will have 6,000 more Marines at some point in the future (when the Marines aren't rotating through Afghanistan). So I'll be generous and call it a net loss of American forces in the region to only 1,700 military personnel from 2000 to 2008.
In what universe is even a slight decrease (2%, or so) considered an "enormous military buildup?" Nowhere. That's where.
OK, one more partial paragraph. I weary of battering my knuckles:
In his new book, Glain laments the rise of the "military industrial complex" President Eisenhower warned about 50 years ago, suggesting defense contractors and their patrons in Congress and the Pentagon have an undue influence on U.S. foreign policy.
Ah, the dreaded military-industrial complex. A lazy reference when you realize that Eisenhower, in fact, believed our military-industrial complex was absolutely necessary given the threats we faced. Yes, he warned of letting it control the debate on defense, but he did not question the need for it (see this post where I explain this toward the end of the post and link to the speech). Implying that blame for an inevitable war between America and China will rest on America--driven by a military-industrial complex--is laziness on steroids masquerading as deep analysis.
And he wrote an entire book on this subject? I think I'll pass. In the end, it is probably just another volume in the long history of books insisting that we need to retreat before foes and dressing it up as being smart, wise, and--dare I say it?--nuanced.
A man's got to know his limitations. Or at least have them pointed out.
