Iraq’s top political leaders agreed late Tuesday that the Iraqi military needs to continue training programs with U.S. forces, marking the first step in a process that still could take months to resolve.
The number appears to be 10,000. Less than what I'd like (3 combat brigades and 3,500 special forces plus support and training personnel), but Cordesman outlines the bare minimum that has to be in that 10,000:
“We don’t need a large combat presence,” said Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We need Special Forces and perhaps some forces who would be effectively combat troops.”
To prevent hard-won security gains from slipping away, Cordesman said, U.S. troops should seek ways to continue operating in north-central Iraq, along the border with the semiautonomous Kurdish region, where violence between Kurds and Arabs sometimes flares.
So could we keep a few thousand special forces in Iraq and perhaps three battalion task forces in Iraq, plus support and whatever trainers are needed within this ceiling?
The battalion task forces could be the core of combat brigades with the equipment left in Iraq ready to receive troops flown in to marry up with the equipment. A brigade in Kuwait that actually runs convoy security inside Iraq could be kept out of the ceiling, right? Air defense could be run from Turkey, Kuwait, and aircraft carriers. A Marine battalion+ (MEU) afloat would be a reserve as would our parachute brigade in Italy. And how many civilian contractors could substitute for uniformed personnel?
I'm curious to see how this is configured. And curious to see how opposition by Moqtada al-Sadr is handled. With a noose is my preference.
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*Saying:
“The Iranian regime continues to violate Iraqi sovereignty by intervening in Iraqi social and political affairs, training and equipping militias to conduct attacks on Iraqi soil and thwarting efforts by the Iraqi people to pursue unfettered the economic growth, development and independence that geography and democracy have bestowed upon them,” the chairman said.
Tehran wants a weak Iraq, beholden to the Iranian world view, Mullen said. “I believe most Iraq’s wish to determine for themselves their own future and to define for themselves their own perspectives about the world around them,” he added.
