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Friday, June 10, 2011

Obstacle to Mission Accomplished

We assumed that NATO intervention would quickly drive Khaddafi from power. But air power hasn't been as effective as we assumed. Now, after three months of NATO bombing, it is a contest of wills.

One, the hope of NATO victory depends on whether NATO has more will to keep bombing (and spending the money to do so) than Khaddafi and his loyalists have the will to endure the bombing in the expectation that it will end before it can drive them from power. NATO is still divided on waging the war, and although the authorization to fight was extended to late September, this battle of wills is far from decided in NATO's favor despite the gradual gnawing away of Khaddafi's forces.

There is now another battle of wills going on. This one is between NATO and the Libyan rebels. NATO, unsure that it can win the first battle of wills, is attempting to pressure the rebels into accepting less than immediate victory so NATO can declare victory and go home:


The main obstacle is the rebel leadership. The UN envoy to Libya has requested that the rebels call for a ceasefire, but they have steadfastly refused to do so until Col. Gadhafi is gone. NATO leaders are no longer demanding Col. Gadhafi’s removal as a prerequisite for stopping the bombing. So where do the rebels get off refusing to accede to a request from the very organization that authorized the bombing in the first place? They should be told in no uncertain terms that, if they’re not prepared to negotiate with Col. Gadhafi’s representatives, NATO’s support in the air and at sea will cease.


Which is an interesting problem. Khaddafi would accept a ceasefire that leaves the rebels in charge of their territory. Retaking that land is a problem for another day. Khaddafi is not the problem in this situation. The rebels are the problem. How do we pressure the rebels? Threaten to go home and let Khaddafi attack them in defiance of UNSC 1973 that calls for the protection of Libyan civilians from Khaddafi's forces? So much for the "duty to protect."

So the rebels cause us more problems than the loyalists in ending this war. I assume this foreign policy is nuanced enough for anyone to appreciate. If our foreign policy gets any smarter, we'll be pressuring Italy into ceding Sicily to Khaddafi as the price of peace.