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Monday, May 23, 2011

Unable to Kill Outside of the Box

Gosh, remember a decade ago when exciting, nimble "4th generation" networked terrorists would run rings around our security bureaucracies unable to react quickly enough to the terrorists' flat organization able to innovate on the move and attack at our points of vulnerability before we could possibly hope to identify those points let alone defend them?

Well, let's see how al Qaeda Prime's former Number 1 waged his ominous "netwar":

The computer files hauled from his hideout in Pakistan have provided intelligence officials with an unparalleled glimpse into the mind of al-Qaida's founder. But perhaps most surprising about the first two attack scenarios to surface in those documents is just how predictable they were.

He hoped to attack trains, just as terrorists had done in Mumbai, India, and Madrid. He retained his fascination with attacking airplanes. And, according to U.S. officials and a law enforcement bulletin Friday, he wanted to hijack oil tankers and blow them up at sea. ...

"This is nothing new," said Christopher Davidson, a professor of Middle East politics at Durham University in northern England. "This is just confirmation of what most security and terror analysts had guessed."

In short, bin Laden wanted to attack just where the U.S. figured he would.

Too many in the West puff up our terrorist enemies by constructing elaborate theories about how brilliant they really are. In reality, they are just paperwork-pushing bureaucrats with blood directly on their hands.

Fourth generation warriors, indeed. How many times have we been told over the years that by attacking and destroying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan we fell for Osama bin Laden's "deep plan?" Instead, it looks an awful lot like we kicked his ass and left him under virtual house arrest unable to think--or kill--outside the box, until we killed him in that box.

We are the ones who are winning this war, as I wrote in the days immediately following 9/11--not helpless giants:

Intelligence and covert operations are the first line of active defense and the first echelon of attack. The aerial suicide attacks on our people and the symbols of our power took enormous amounts of time to carry out. This is one weakness of our enemy. While they may carry out small attacks using small arms or small bombs at a moment's notice, truly horrific attacks require time because they must be planned in the shadows to avoid detection. We must increase our ability to detect such preparations and make sure the information is interpreted to provide timely and specific warnings. Then, the people who need this information must actually get the warning in time to take actions.

More importantly, we must exploit the fact that these attacks take time to organize. Intelligence must track the enemy terror cells in order to strike the enemy and disrupt them by keeping them on the move and by killing or arresting their operatives. We must sow confusion and paranoia in their ranks to slow them down and get them to fight each other. Our ability to use so many weapons is one advantage of being a powerful state. We may be a large target but we are not a helpless giant. America can direct precise or massive force quickly and globally as needed. Keeping the initiative is crucial. This will compel our enemies to start their preparation from scratch again and again. Giving the enemy time to prepare only guarantees that eventually they will be ready and will strike.

Careers are made in the West by inflating our enemies' brilliance. Don't confuse these academic-created images of 10--feet tall terrorists with the reality that we fight--and kill or arrest--every day. Our enemies may be evil, murdering, bastards, but they aren't evil geniuses running rings around us.

Don't get me wrong, they can and do innovate. This doesn't mean we can assume we fight total idiots. But remember that we innovate, too. And our enemies have to fill out paperwork and file it.

Our enemies need to be killed and we can kill them. Let's get on with it.