To some critics, this looked like "mission creep," the problem that arises when a limited humanitarian intervention expands to become a more ambitious war. But that's not quite right. In this war, perhaps uniquely, mission creep happened at the outset, when Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy publicly committed themselves to removing Kadafi from power.
Now, NATO is facing a prospect even worse than mission creep: mission failure. To prevent it, NATO has adopted a strategy that won a bad name almost half a century ago in Vietnam: graduated escalation, the attempt to find the enemy's breaking point with the minimum necessary force.
Exactly.
McManus also notes that recalling the success of Allied Force to argue we must be patient for victory now must also include remembering that inconvenient fact that NATO was gearing up for a land invasion, too, as bombing alone failed to dislodge the Serbs from Kosovo. I covered that in some depth here.
Although it is not online, in April 1998 I wrote an article ("Landpower Needed for Decisive Victory") for Army magazine discussing the limitations of our strategy in the Tripolitan War. In part, I concluded:
With an "American" ground force in place, [NOTE: Referring to our expedition that had captured Derna in eastern Libya, consisting of a small Marine Corps contingent and mercenaries supported by our naval fire.] the Bashaw had been compelled to seek peace. Just as true, the expedition was a poor substitute for a regular American Army. Sufficient to force a peace of sorts, the Derna force could not win outright. This outcome should caution Americans against expecting only cheap, quick and clear victories in limited wars. The Tripoli settlement also demonstrates the price of avoiding "mission creep." Raising objectives requires greater commitment. Barron kept his objectives in mind and did not force the Bashaw to choose victory or death. Instead, peace was restored; Americans were released, and most of the American ships could go home. The war also emphasized the need to make sure the Bashaw kept the peace. Victory must be maintained, especially in a limited war that leaves an enemy intact.
Of course, the modern Libya War is not a case study in mission creep, as noted.
But the lesson of limited force ratcheted up during the Tripolitan War of 1801-1805 until we achieved our limited objective applies now for our war in the same location. Unfortunately, we can't heed the lesson of 1805 where we refused to raise our objective of halting piracy to one of regime change. I've lamented that President Obama denied us the option of a limited objective by stating that Khaddafi "must go." Yet we did not commit the means to achieve that maximum goal. Settling for less than regime change now would be a case of "mission retreat." That would be known as "defeat." A limited "victory" of fulfilling UNSC 1973 and protecting rebel civilians now will leave an enemy we have to contain--and probably have to deal with years later.
Khaddafi and his people are clawing and gouging for their very survival, believing their choice is between victory and death; and we're attempting nuanced applications of kinetic actions to signal they should go.
Gosh, how will this turn out?
