An Air Power Purist's Wet Dream

A thought struck me when a TV host reported that Libyan rebels are advancing west with coalition air support aiding them. In fact, there is no coalition "air support." Air support implies that there is coordination going on between air power and ground forces. One "supports" something else. With no American forces on the ground to call in air strikes where and when needed by the rebels (although perhaps the Brits and French, less squeamish about this whole boots on the ground controversy, have forward observers on the ground), what we are witnessing are two separate campaigns against the loyalists--one on the ground by a mostly armed mob and one by professional air forces.

Ever since planes could carry bombs, air power advocates have insisted that they could win wars without the blood of ground combat. It hasn't worked out. In World War II, not only did it not work out but the bomber air crews over Germany suffered losses on par with infantry. More recently in the 1990s during two Balkan crises, air power purists believed they had the chance to show their stuff. I don't think that worked out, either. Even with precision munitions.

After a decade of supporting soldiers and Marines on the ground in an admirable display of jointness (I'm sincerely impressed and appreciative of how well our Air Force has provided accurate ground support where and when needed) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Libya War provides an opportunity for air power purists to prove that they can win a war all on their own in an air campaign that can do what it wants for the most part, without regard to the rebels. Just avoiding friendly fire and collateral damage are the only constraints.

Well, there are those rebels on the ground, true. But if the coalition air strikes can drive Khaddafi from power before rebels march in to Tripoli and string Khaddaif from a lamp post, mission accomplished!

UPDATE: Strategypage notes the difficulties of using air power only to defeat ground forces, but sets out the "desert exception," so to speak. It is true, as they say, that air power is most effective on the flat, open terrain like Libya. That's why I've suggested that Libyan loyalist resistance is better done in the cities where we have to be careful about hitting civilian targets.

And it is why I've said that the loyalists should move between the cities in short moves between hiding points and in small numbers to minimize their time under the gaze of our recon assets that will bring down the firepower on them.

Most important, it is why I think the loyalists should use civilian vehicles whenever possible. Indeed, human shields would help them out in the open. One bus loaded with refugees bombed by NATO by mistake (even after bombing fifty buses loaded with ammo and fighters) with pictures broadcast to the world would be as valuable to the loyalists as a brand new integrated air defense system.