[The] demonstrators are deeply divided among themselves and thus far do not appear to have been able to generate the type of mass movement that toppled the Shah of Iran’s regime in 1979. More important, the demonstrators are clearly united in opposing Mubarak as an individual, and to a large extent united in opposing the regime. Beyond that, there is a deep divide in the opposition.
Western media has read the uprising as a demand for Western-style liberal democracy. Many certainly are demanding that. What is not clear is that this is moving Egypt’s peasants, workers and merchant class to rise en masse. Their interests have far more to do with the state of the Egyptian economy than with the principles of liberal democracy. As in Iran in 2009, the democratic revolution, if focused on democrats, cannot triumph unless it generates broader support.
The other element in this uprising is the Muslim Brotherhood. The consensus of most observers is that the Muslim Brotherhood at this point is no longer a radical movement and is too weak to influence the revolution. This may be possible, but it is not obvious. The Muslim Brotherhood has many strands, many of which have been quiet under Mubarak’s repression. It is not clear who will emerge if Mubarak falls. It is certainly not clear that they are weaker than the democratic demonstrators. It is a mistake to confuse the Muslim Brotherhood’s caution with weakness.
It's easy to focus on the protesters who want freedom and democracy as the best case or the Islamists as the worst case, but I don't assume that either are the ones who would emerge at the top once the dust settles if they all topple the Mubarak government.
Strafor looks at the options and they seem about right, as does their best guess on the outcome:
If I were forced to choose, I would bet on the regime stabilizing itself and Mubarak leaving because of the relative weakness and division of the demonstrators. But that’s a guess and not a forecast.
But it is always easiest to predict the future based on past performance. I tend to agree that the government will basically hold since it already has endured a lot. And the fragmentation of the opposition leads me to guess that fear of chaos will make a lot of protesters happy to have sent Mubarak into exile and call it a victory. Bits of the regime break off (the Mubarak family, in particular) but the whole survives.
We should not, if this happens, sigh in relief and go on as if nothing happened. We must revive the Bush era policy of pushing Egypt for real reforms based on the scare of a lifetime that could in the short term make Egyptian elites more willing to actually reform. But that depends on the relatively happy outcome unfolding, and we really can't know what will happen.
