Given my worries that NATO hasn't come up with military plans to defend our new eastern NATO members, this aside was actually comforting to me, in a portion discussing the problem for Poland that a Russian-German understanding could pose:
The Polish leaders I spoke to all made it clear that they did not see this as a problem. I find it hard to believe that a German-Russian understanding does not concern the Poles. Yes, I know that neither Germany nor Russia intends Poland harm. But an elephant doesn’t necessarily plan to harm a mouse. Intentions aside, the mouse gets harmed.
I think the real point the Poles are making is that they have no choice. When I pointed out the option of the Intermarium with American backing, a senior Foreign Ministry official pointed out that under the new NATO plan the Germans have guaranteed two divisions to defend Poland while the United States has offered one brigade. He was extraordinarily bitter on this score. Following on the American decision to withdraw from a commitment to construct a fixed, permanent Ballistic Missile Defense installation in Poland and the tentative nature of a rotational deployment of a single Patriot battery, he saw this as a betrayal by the United States of earlier commitments. I lamely made the argument that one American brigade is a more effective fighting force than two contemporary German divisions, but that is debatable at best, and I deliberately missed the point. His charge was that there was no American commitment under the new NATO plan, or at least nothing credible.
One, we apparently have some sort of a military plan for Poland and the other eastern countries. I assume that a German promise of two divisions and an American promise of a brigade are meant to be tripwires deployed forward in a crisis. If we send a single brigade and it looks like war, more brigades will follow. As far as I'm concerned, the important thing is to have US forces on the ground. We have but a single brigade in South Korea--is that meaningless to the defense of South Korea?
I would like measures to make sure we can rapidly reinforce any single brigade sent forward. But maybe the lack of that sort of planning is what is viewed as a lack of a credible plan to defend NATO.
Further, it isn't far-fetched to worry about a German-Russian understanding. You never can tell when future leaders in Moscow and Berlin will decide that a flat Poland is too risky to allow it to fall into the hands of the other side.
We need to keep NATO a thriving alliance not only for Poland's defense against a future rearmed Russia, but to keep Germany tied to the West rather than reaching out to cut side deals with the Russians. Indeed, it is important to keep all the European powers tied to the West and not cutting side deals all over the place in efforts to gain an edge over their neighbors.
As an aside, I don't know about the Intermarium idea. Wouldn't that just create a vast single entity so vast that the Russians and Germans would believe it was too risky to risk it flipping to the other side yet still be too weak to defend itself against either a German or Russian military (assuming rearming in the future)?
