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Friday, December 10, 2010

Look Out Below!

North Korea is teetering. Strategypage runs down the situation on the people who are too ground down to care much about anything but food and heat; a military of less-than loyal victims of the famine 20 years ago and being kept busy confronting South Korea (and "the world" out to get them) lest they become a threat to the regime--and to extort food and fuel out of Seoul; and increasingly corrupt security forces that know that loss of control could mean their deaths if the regime collapses.

South Korea, however, doesn't want to give in to threats any more. And China is unwilling to supply their ally with food and fuel. So the ride could get rough:

This could get interesting, because the north feels compelled to get free food anyway it can, and disarmament (especially of its nukes) is out-of-the-question. So another barrage of shells or rockets along the DMZ, or a submarine attack on American warships, another commando attack in the north, perhaps even kidnapping people, or a Kamikaze air attack, are all possibilities South Korea and its allies have to cope with. While southern retaliation is more certain next time, escalation to a full blown war is less likely. As damaging as this is to the south, it is suicide for the north (at least for the small ruling class and their minions). The north wants to keep the pot boiling, not knock it over.

I don't buy it that because South Korea doesn't want to risk Seoul and North Korea doesn't want to risk regime suicide, that war is less likely. One, with two militaries in such close proximity, escalation could take place quickly once bullets fly along the DMZ. Two, how do we know that the North Koreans believe war would be suicide? And how do we know that the North Koreans believe that South Korea and America are willing to go to war?

What if the North Koreans believe they'd win a war? Even if the North Koreans understand that war would mean their utter defeat, what if the North Koreans believe that we'd never risk war and so any North Korean provocation does not risk igniting a war? What if the North Koreans believe they'd lose a gull-blown war, understand that we will begin a war if the North provokes South Korea too much, yet still believes that we are too soft to go toe-to-toe? What if the North Koreans believe we'd flinch after the first big battle that leads to lots of southern casualties? What if, let's have real fun here, the North Koreans believe that a massive does of chemical weapons would surely break our fragile morale, allowing the superior North Korean Man to prevail in battle?

Reading a Joint Forces Command report on Iraq's perspectives on the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) shows that the Iraqis truly did not believe that America would pull the trigger and attack them. And if we did, they'd survive the attack. Other assumptions and conclusions the Iraqis made clearly demonstrate the danger of mirror-imaging (assuming a foe thinks like you do). North Koreans are far more isolated than Iraq's leadership. I refuse to assume that North Korea knows they'd lose and probably all end up dangling from lamp posts if they provoke a war.

Yet North Kora is teetering and seems poised to fall. The problem is that if we can avoid war, North Korea is likely to fall--possibly soon. That's what the South Korean president believes, anyway:

"North Korea now remains one of the most belligerent nations in the world," Lee said in the interview published Friday in The Star, a Malaysian newspaper. But, he added, it's a "fact that the two Koreas will have to coexist peacefully and, in the end, realize reunification."

In a speech Thursday night, Lee made similar remarks, saying that North Koreans have become increasingly aware that the South is better off. He did not elaborate on how their knowledge has expanded, but he said it was "an important change that no one can stop."

"Reunification is drawing near," Lee said, according to the president's website.

Which makes responding to North Korean provocations problematic. As I noted early on, if our current policy of containing and squeezing North Korea until it collapses is a winning strategy in the long run, responding to North Korean attacks in ways that risk a war in the short run is counter-productive. Sure, we'd most likely win any war that breaks out. But if we could win a relatively bloodless (ignoring the many domestic victims of North Korea's brutal government over the decades, obviously) victory by patiently waiting for a collapse that might happen too fast for the Northern elites to initiate war to short-circuit in an effort to rally the people against a foreign enemy, why escalate and risk war?

Of course, we don't know when North Korea will collapse. They've been collapsing a long time. And China might flood the North with food and fuel if collapse appears imminent. So if we don't know when North Korea will collapse, failing to respond to North Korean attacks could help bolster the military and the hard-liners, and prolong the regime by making it look like they can literally get away with murder and any outrage. That undermines the strategy of working toward a North Korean collapse. Further, delay the collapse long enough and North Korea will eventually have long-range nuclear-tipped missiles.

And failing to respond to attacks by the North could cripple South Korean morale--both military and civilian.

Coping with a teetering North Korea is surely better than coping with a strong North Korea that has the capability of capturing Seoul and sweeping south. But when the rotting tree falls, look out below.

UPDATE: Rhetoric or do they really believe this?

The North's National Peace Committee also claimed that the U.S. and South Korea are pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula close to all-out war.

"The army and people of the (North) are ready for both escalated war and an all-out war," the committee said in a statement carried by KCNA. "They will deal merciless retaliatory blows at the provocateurs and aggressors and blow up their citadels and bases."

I just don't think it is prudent to assume it is rhetoric. Also consider that even if many or most of North Korea's rulers know that North Korea could not win all-out war, the rhetoric of invincibility may constrain their ability to act on that knowledge since denying North Korea's claimed power could be hazardous to their personal survival.