"Without a new treaty, we'll risk turning back the progress we've made in our relationship with Russia, which is essential to enforce strong sanctions against Iran, secure vulnerable nuclear materials from terrorists and resupply our troops in Afghanistan," Obama said.
So rather than being topics of mutual interest, halting Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, securing nuclear material, and winning the war against jihadis in Afghanistan are favors Russia granted us?
And these favors clearly hinge on START ratfication since the implication is that without START, the Russians will reduce or halt our common efforts to stop Iran, keep nuclear bomb material out of jihadi hands, and defeat jihadis in Afghanistan.
So if there is a clear bargain here, just what did we give Russia in the START treaty that led them to cooperate with us on Iran, nuclear material, and Afghanistan in the first place?
When the administration argues on merits outside of the actual treaty, I get suspicous. Maybe it is a good idea to give something away in START if it gets Russia to move toward friendship with the West. Strategypage does say they are moving that way recently:
In the last few months, it has become clear that senior officials have decided to switch from criticizing the West, to cooperation. This includes participating in building an anti-missile system (to protect from Iranian, or other Middle Eastern, attacks) and discussing joining NATO. This switch had long been debated within Russia, with many politicians and officials arguing that it was more in Russia's interest to align with the West, against long time foes like Iran and China. Wikileaks revelations also pointed out how attempts to battle the West, diplomatically and economically, have not gone too well.
This is good. I want Russia to think of themselves as part of the West. But if we are making a deal to push this along, I want to know what is being exchanged. When the currency is nuclear weapons, this is--to borrow from Vice President Biden--a big freaking deal.
Of course, this information indicates that Russia's decision to move toward the West is completely separate from the START treaty and hinged on worry about Iran and China as well as few results from their efforts to rally the Rest against the West. So how would failure to delay START until questions about its provisions are answered derail better relations?
For example, I want changes on isues related to national missile defense that make it clear that we are not hobbled if we want defenses beyond whatever the Obama administration plans. The Russians seem to think they have a veto and Obama administration protests that the treaty doesn't hinder our current plans does not impress me because I'm not sure that the administration's plans are sufficient.
I am also not impressed with the limits on launchers because in practice only we have to eliminate missiles. Russia can't afford to maintain their missiles and their numbers of intercontinental missiles will drop quite a lot with or without a treaty.
Further, what about Russia's advanatage in shorter range missiles that can't threaten the continental United States but can sure as heck reach our allies who we have pledged to defend with the deterrence of our long-range missiles?
I also read early on that the issue of telemetry from Russian missile tests is inadequate to protect our interests. I've read nothing further on this issue in the so-called debate we've had, and searching for "telemetric" in the public treaty documents didn't clarify the issue for me. I know far too little on this subject to know from reading the documents (here and here) what the passages really mean in practice.
What I do think I know is that the failure to discuss this issue in favor of extolling on-site inspections is a red herring. On-site inspections didn't work in Iraq in the 1990s. How much better do we expect them to work in the practically infinitely larger Russia?
The START treaty may be the best thing since sliced bread, either for nuclear issues or for our overall foreign policy. But I don't have nearly enough information to conclude that. I suspect it has numerous flaws that make it a bad deal. And I don't believe that Russia will be naughty or nice contingent on the passage of this treaty.
The Senate should not rubber-stamp this treaty. Advice and consent should be done properly when nukes are involved. If it is a bad freaking deal, we need to know.
