I find it hard to believe that General Petraeus would allow this, but if true this is disturbing:
Our focus on more armor, force protection, and reducing casualties had ceded the initiative and the terrain to the insurgents and cost us our credibility with one of eastern Afghanistan's largest tribes.
Generally, is armor driving our strategy rather than supporting it?
To be clear, fault does not lie with the MRAP, MATV, or any other armored vehicle. It lies with how commanders are using the vehicles due to their aversion to risk and their attempts to minimize coalition injuries at the expense of the broader counterinsurgency mission. The vehicles' size would not be a hindrance to that mission if junior coalition commanders were also authorized to use other smaller vehicles to access the difficult areas of Afghanistan. For example, if a unit needed to access a village that was only accessible by pickup truck or Humvee, then that is what they would use.
This, however, was not the case during my most recent tour in southeastern Afghanistan, which ended in February of this year. What I found is that commanders were mandating the use of MRAPs only. If a unit did not have MRAPs or some other type of armored vehicle, then troopers were not allowed to leave the base at all.
This sounds like a minor tactical issue, but its consequences are having strategic effects on how we conduct the war and our ability to access the population. As one frustrated company commander told me after the directive, "If an MRAP can't get there, we don't go there. I need the flexibility to decide what type of vehicle to use."
This seemingly cautious approach not only contradicts the principles behind our counterinsurgency strategy, but it is actually reckless: It will end up causing more casualties in the long run than it prevents in the short run. Using only these behemoth vehicles prevents U.S. troops from accessing large portions of the populace and allows insurgent IED cells to flourish in areas relatively easy to reach by other means. We cannot protect a populace we do not allow ourselves to access.
Another commander, looking up at the hills and mountains surrounding his camp, lamented that he was now unable to access more than 70 percent of his assigned districts. "My men can only walk so far with their body armor on," he said as we chatted near the line of Humvees he could no longer use. To make matters worse, there was an additional requirement of a minimum of four vehicles in order to leave the wire even when a unit didn't have enough working MRAPs to meet the requirement.
American casualties this year are running at a lower rate than what I expected we would face (looking to fall short by about a hundred of the 573 casualties I expected) when I contemplated in the winter 2009-2010 the new surge for 2010. I attributed this lower loss rate to more MRAPs. This seems to be true and is a good thing. What is bad however, is the possibility that we are taking our eye off the ball.
Winning the war--even if it requires higher casualties in the short run--is the objective. Making lower casualties the main objective in the short run puts off winning (and risks defeat) which will in the long run make our total casualties higher.
Unfortunately, I can believe that the Obama administration would tell our military to make force protection the priority over all else. False compassion may make you feel good in the short run. But you'll feel far worse in the end if you have to think about the men and women who died for nothing in a lost war.
Oh sure, you can comfort yourself with intricate theories about how we were really doomed to lose no matter what, but that excuse lasts only so long. Eventually, the truth comes out that you lost a winnable war. If that evolution can happen for the Vietnam War, it will happen for Afghanistan if we lose this war by failing to try to win--even though good men and women will die to achieve that victory.
