This article by authors from haughtily named Consensus for American Security claims the US military is enthusiastic about the treaty and rebuts complaints about the provisions:
The treaty compromises missile defense, critics claim. Not so, according to Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O'Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency, who, along with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, has repeatedly made clear that the new treaty has no implications for our missile-defense plans. On the contrary, Gen. O'Reilly told senators, the treaty "actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program."
Russia can't be trusted to comply with the terms of the treaty, critics say. This claim turns President Reagan's admonishment that we should "trust, but verify" on its head. By opposing the treaty, critics are arguing in favor of eliminating on-site surveillance and inspections of the Russian nuclear arsenal that are the only checks we have against Russian untrustworthiness.
Here's what the current commander of STRATCOM, Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the danger involved in rejecting the treaty:
"If we don't get the treaty, [the Russians] are not constrained in their development-of-force structure and ... we have no insight into what they're doing, so it's the worst of both possible worlds."
It's worth stepping back for a moment to ask the question why, if any of the things critics claim were remotely true, the treaty would have such overwhelming support among the military?
I don't buy this consensus claim one bit. One, claiming overwhelming military support exceeds any evidence presented. Two, even if certain higher ranking serving officers have come out in favor, don't forget that they must obey their civilian leaders. Salute and obey, remember.
On the particulars, I am not convinced when defenders of the treaty claim that the treaty doesn't hinder our "development" of missile defenses. Sure, Russia apparently has no problem with research. But "deployment" is another thing altogether, and is an issue that treaty proponents glide by without addressing. If "development" is equivalent to "deployment" why are the Russians still raising a stink about plans to break ground on building such a defense in Europe?
Russia will only agree to work with NATO on building a ballistic-missile defence in Europe if it receives guarantees that the system cannot be used to bring down its own nuclear arsenal, the country's deputy foreign minister said Friday.
If this is what we think of as reducing constraints, I don't want to know what hindering us would look like. The Russians have not green-lighted building missile defenses capable of protecting America, and claims that START clears the path are outrageous.
As for verification, it is all well and good that we would have people on the ground, but my understanding is that the Russians won't send missile test telemetry in the clear as we've used in the past to read their data and determine if the Russians are developing banned technologies. Address this please instead of waxing on about the wonders of on-the-ground inspectors. We had that in Iraq for many years before 2003 and we know how well that worked in the face of a government that wants to obstruct what our people see.
As for Russia not being constrained without the treaty? Poppycock. Russia can't afford what they have now and they will reduce their nuclear forces from cost alone in the years ahead. The START treaty gives Russia the security of knowing we will reduce our forces, too.
Unmentioned are the theater nuclear missiles that Russia can keep in large numbers outside the treaty. Being simpler and cheaper, they'll remain a cornerstone of Russia's arsenal since so many targets are close by and since Russia relies on nukes to defend their long borders.
There is absolutely no hurry to concluding a treaty with Russia. Time is on our side. Let's do this right. Reject the proposed START treaty. Start over.
