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Friday, March 05, 2010

Overview of the Marjah Operation

This is a nice overview of the Marjah operation, and clarifies some of the numbers issues:

I think most of you are aware that D-Day went on the 13th of February. RCT-7 (Regimental Combat Team) under Colonel Randy Newman inserted three companies of Afghan and U.S. Marines between the hours of zero-two and zero-five on that night. They were inserted by our aviation combat element led by Colonel "Beak" Vest and the U.S. Army Combat Aviation Brigade, Paul Bricker, and supported by Colonel John Simmons in our combat logistics regiment.

What we wanted to accomplish very quickly was to go big, strong and fast, get into the center of Marja, occupy the spine of Marja if you will, and start clearing out. We were able to insert all of our heliborne forces without incident, and at first light -- we wanted to wait till first light to begin moving our ground forces in. We were prepared to breach at several different sites.

We had a deception operation in the sense that we amassed forces at areas we had no intention of breaching on, and at first light we moved swiftly and, using the Assault Breacher Vehicle, we were able to get through the minefields, which were significant, and the enemy had lots of time to plan and shape those. But we were able to move in relatively unencumbered. So we got about 4,000 Marines, Afghans and soldiers into Marja relatively quickly.

I also see the number 15,000 thrown a lot, and that might include all of the support that is involved in the operation. But within Marja today, we have about 2,500 U.S. Marines and about 1,500 Afghan soldiers. In addition, we have about 600 ANCOP, or National Police.

We did a little shaping part of the operation, and Stryker Battalion -- U.S. Army Stryker Battalion 423 Infantry did a great job of holding 11 bridges that connected Marja from Nad Ali on a canal there.

The briefer also notes that the Afghan forces represented from a third to a quarter of the total, including a battalion that operates independently rather than being essentially attached to US forces, in contrast to the last big operation that had Afghans as only about 10% of the total force.

The enemy boasted they'd defeat us and stop us. They did not. Now we need to show that we can absorb the area and not just deny it to the enemy.