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Saturday, September 19, 2009

The Minstrels Arrive!

I wrote that our president's retreat would inspire the bards of the media to sing of his bravery. Not even the sellout of Poland by cancelling our planned missile defenses on a particularly inconvenient day would stop the media that loves our president from calling running away "bravery."

Well here's a lovely little ditty.


Barack Obama has finally called time on the Bush administration's controversial plan to build a missile-defense shield in Eastern Europe. The announcement caused widespread consternation. The Czechs and the Poles, who had hoped that the system would somehow protect them against Russian aggression, were appalled. (The Polish prime minister refused to take a call from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton informing him of the decision.) Conservative Americans, who counted on the missile shield to contain Iranian missiles, decried Obama’s move as dangerous, or even treasonous. Only Russia, which believed that the system would somehow impair their ability to use their own nuclear missiles, was delighted. The real question, though, isn't whether Obama is right or wrong about the system's efficacy. (He's obviously right.)


"He's obviously right"! The Poles and Czechs are upset and the Russians are happy--but this in no way indicates we retreated from Russia!

The Iranians haven't weighed in on this decision, but they already think President Obama is putty in their hands. They could be getting tired noting every single American retreat in the face of Iran's positions.

And gallantly he chickened out.

Brave, brave Sir Robin.

It's from Newsweek. As if you had to be told!

Not to be outdone in sucking up to the administration, Time magazine weighs in:


But just because Russia had furiously opposed the missile shield on its doorstep doesn't necessarily mean building it would have been a good idea. The military rationale for Obama's move is hard to argue with. (Read "Mixed Reactions in Europe to the U.S. Missile-Defense U-Turn")

Viewed from the perspective of defense priorities, what the Administration has done is shift resources away from building a costly, immovable and as yet unproven shield in central Europe to counter the potential threat of Iran's developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, instead allocating them to deploying ships carrying proven interceptor systems nearer to Iran to counter the current threat of its medium-range-missile arsenal.

Among other advantages, the ships can sail freely in international waters to meet evolving threats without obtaining consent from host countries (the Czech parliament, for example, had yet to approve the deployment of the now canceled system).


This article also includes a fascinating but irrelevant history of missile defense efforts in an effort to ridicule the Bush plan. But despite asserting that President Obama's plan is better, the author gives no compelling reason. His ship-based SM-3 arguments are unconvincing.

The SM-3 has a range of 500 kilometers against short- and intermediate-range missiles (I've seen the range also given as 300 km., but I'll assume the greater range). It's a fine missile. We surely need it. But it isn't what Bush planned to put in eastern Europe. We'd have to put Aegis SM-3-equipped ships in the Baltic, North Sea, Channel, Atlantic, Mediterranean, Tyrrenhean, Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Sea, hugging the coast--and we'd still have gaps in the coverage of Europe. That's why the new plan sees putting SM-3 on land, too.

Oh, and assume we'd need 3 ships for every one needed on station in order to rotate ships. And as for being able to use them elsewhere when not needed for missile defense as the Time author states, just when would that be? We need missile defense 24/7 and 365 days/year!

Nor would any number of SM-3s on ships in European waters (or off our coast) or on land in Europe do what the 10 missiles envisioned by Bush could do--shoot at missiles launched from Iran against the eastern United States.

Yes, Brave Sir Robin turned about.

Sing along, now! You know the words!

UPDATE: Strategypage writes that the idea is to put SM-3-equipped ships in the Persian Gulf to shoot down Iranian missiles heading out in the boost phase:

The U.S. believes ship based Aegis systems in the Persian Gulf could also protect Europe, But the East Europeans are having none of it, and sense yet another betrayal by the rest of Europe and America. In East Europe, it's not forgotten how a British prime minister announced, in 1938, that he had achieved, "peace in our time" by making a deal with the devil (Adolf Hitler). Back then, no one trusted Russia. For those with long memories, it's difficult to trust Russia even today.


The feeling of betrayal is real, of course, regardless of whether you think the Poles and other East Europeans are "wrong" to feel abandoned by America. By the "reasonable neighbor of Russia" standard, it is ridiculous for us to tell the Poles they are wrong to worry. Yes, in time this feeling may wear off if we can reassure the Poles in other ways. But damage has been done to our ties with Eastern Europe and our reputation.

But back to the sea-based idea. Even if we put the Aegis ships in Iranian territorial waters, the 500 kilometer range leaves large chunks of Iran outside of the reach of the SM-3. So Iran only has to get our a ruler and plot the points in the interior of Iran where they can launch free and clear. Which is why I assumed the SM-3s would be based around the targets (and which is why I assumed we also planned to put some of our missiles on land in Eastern Europe).

And since the Iranian missiles would be heading northwest, we'd be chasing any Iranian missiles launched toward Europe, so that would effectively shorten the range of our SM-3s and require us to fire them off pretty early in the Iranian launch, which would raise the chance of error. How many times could we shoot at a phantom signal or test launch before we get too timid to respond?

Plus, SM-3-equipped ships in the Persian Gulf aren't exactly safe from a surprise Pearl Harbor at sea by the Iranians with a blitz of conventional and unconventional attacks that might precede a nuclear missile attack.

Again, SM-3s are great missiles for the purpose they were designed for--but they aren't a replacement for what the ground-based interceptors formerly planned for Eastern Europe.

I don't care how many writers sing a song of praise for the so-called brilliance of the Obama plan. Unless more details show up that show me what I'm missing, it's all a song about which of our body parts is going to be hacked to bits.