But one thing I was also firm on was that we needed to defeat the enemy in the field. I don't know if defeating insurgents and terrorists is 10% military and 90% non-military or some other percent, but I'm sure that the first X percent has to be the military side:
Don't get confused about statements that COIN isn't mostly military force. That is a true statement. But security is the first part of successful COIN. And security includes atomizing the enemy and making them worry about surviving.
Taheri notes that too many in Afghanistan may be forgetting that just because defeating an insurgency relies on non-military means doesn't mean that military force is unimportant. It is common for our officials to emphasize the non-military goals:
If pressed, they offer various answers: Afghanistan's poverty, gender inequality, corruption, the drug trade, ethnic rivalries and intrigues by rival powers such as Pakistan and Iran.
Obviously, none of those problems has a military solution. But the main problem Afghanistan faces today is the threat posed to the security of its citizens and infrastructure by insurgents using terror tactics such as roadside bombings and suicide attacks.
And that problem does have a military solution -- indeed, the only solution is military. The insurgents must be defeated on the battlefield.
This is correct. We mustn't be shy about chasing down and killing the enemy. Dead jihadis are always a good thing. Dead jihadis don't halt those efforts to build and educate.
