Agreements negotiated ahead of time give Obama something to take home before the summit even got under way, including another step toward the world's two largest nuclear powers reducing their arsenals.
I fear this will be a pointless exercise since Russia's arsenal will decline with absolutely no agreement at all because Russia's vast Soviet-built nuclear arsenal is reaching the end of its life span and Russia can't afford to replace much of it.
An agreement with Russia is a favor to them, really. Atlthough if this is all there is, it is harmless and will save us money.
The problem arises if we view a nuclear arms agreement as anything but a favor to Russia and actually give something to Russia in return. Missile defense could be at risk:
Yet, the two sides remain in a stalemate over the U.S. pursuit of a missile-defense system in Europe. Obama's administration is reviewing the efficacy of plan, which Bush had pushed hard.
U.S. leaders have expressed hope of getting Russian cooperation on missile defense. But both sides have also shown signs of hardening their positions ahead of the summit.
The basic problem is unchanged: The U.S. contends the program is designed to protect U.S. allies in Europe from a potential nuclear attack by Iran, but the Russians see it as a first step toward a system that could weaken their offensive nuclear strike potential.
President Obama needs to separate offensive missile deals from ABM. He's starting off good on this issue:
Yet, the two sides remain stalemated over the U.S. pursuit of a missile-defense system in Europe, pushed aggressively by Bush and still under review by Obama's 7-month-old administration. Both sides hardened their positions ahead of the summit, and Obama gave a lengthy rationale for the system at Medvedev's side.
Obama suggested the United States has a right to pursue defensive systems separate from the offensive weapons that are the subject of most arms control negotiations. Obama repeated the U.S. position that the planned system is aimed at intercepting missiles from Iran and has nothing to do with countering" a mighty Russian arsenal," as many in Russia suspect.
Despite these good words, I fear that our "independent" review of ABM will conclude ABM in eastern Europe isn't worth it, making for a de facto exchange of lower offensive missile strength for ending our ABM sites in Poland and the Czech Republic even though nothing in print will suggest a formal linkage.
If we trade away our proposed eastern Europe missile defenses for Russian cuts in nuclear missiles they'll make anyway, we will put our European allies at risk if Iran gets nuclear missiles.
Plus we'll weaken our commitment to our new NATO allies close to Russia.
And worst of all, by linking Russian missiles with our missile defenses we'll fuel Russian paranoia by implicitly accepting the Russian argument that our missile defenses are aimed at Russia and not Iran. After the signing buzz has worn off from the lovely ceremonies, Russian paranoia will reassert itself and relations will be back where they were.
Happy reset!
UPDATE: Ralph Peters votes for dangerous.
