Newsweek's editors may have performed a public service by bringing up one of the biggest mistakes the United States made in Vietnam: backing the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South Vietnam, in 1963. President John F. Kennedy and his aides thought Diem was a divisive, ineffective leader, and they feared that the war could never succeed with him in power. It turned out, though, that Diem's successors were even worse and that his overthrow set off a long period of instability that handicapped U.S. war efforts.
Why is this relevant today? Because senior U.S. officials increasingly blame our woes in Afghanistan on that country's leader, Hamid Karzai. The trend was already evident last February, when then-Sen. Joe Biden walked out of a dinner with the Afghan president in Kabul. Yesterday, the new director of national intelligence, Dennis Blair, condemned "Kabul's inability to build effective, honest and loyal . . . institutions." More and more, senior administration officials signal that they want to replace Karzai.
Boot wants us to focus on the war by pursuing classic counter-insurgency in Afghanistan that will allow whoever is in the throne in Kabul to govern more effectively. I think the Diem warning is particularly appropriate for the Obama administration to hear, given the eagerness of his base to cry "Vietnam." Angling for a replacement for Karzai that might bypass the electoral process is madness and misses the point that Kabul is not the center of gravity in Afghanistan:
If rivals of Karzai think this is a green light to abandon elections as a means to power, whoever takes over will be viewed as "our man" and we will own Afghanistan. Remember the "Pottery Barn rule" that liberals once said about Iraq in the summer of 2003? You break it, you own it?
This is just idiotic. Does anybody remember Diem? For a group of people enthralled with reliving the Vietnam War protest era, they sure do seem committed to recreating it somewhere. They failed to lose the war in Iraq. Is Afghanistan their Vietnam Experience Tour now? Do we really want to own Afghanistan and push the Afghans aside to fight the Taliban?
The proper response to an ineffective central government is not to put somebody else in charge at the center, expecting a miracle worker. Given Afghanistan's history, the correct response is to minimize the role of the corrupt central government to focus on the (admittedly corrupt) provincial and local leaders. At least the latter approach means stolen money is dispersed throughout the country rather than staying in Kabul and making the place a coup magnet. Even if we could find an "Afghan Thomas Jefferson," the central government is not the place for such a man. And keeping Afghans in the fight is the key. We can't alienate them or make them passive viewers of a war they care nothing about.
Don't own Afghanistan. We won't like what we buy. And nobody in their right mind can think this administration or its supporters will pay the price.
Personally, I supported the Iraq surge concept of putting US forces into the field only because it was pretty clear that the practice of using US forces to "clear" while Iraqi forces "held" was faltering because Iraqi forces were too weak relative to the enemy jihadis and death squads to do the holding. We stepped in during the surge to both clear and hold to break the enemy and make them weak enough to return to the old strategy--which is working and more, as Iraqi forces not only hold but take the lead in clearing as well.
Luckily, the surge in Iraq worked far faster than I dreamed. My nightmare was that while the strategy was sound, the short run casualties would have killed our national morale faster than the strategy could bear fruit. It did not.
I still think that the old pre-surge strategy could have worked if our national will to support the Iraqis while they very slowly gained an edge on the enemies had held. But it would have taken time that in retrospect probably would have run out about a month ago.
I'm not so sure we can replicate classic counter-insurgency in Afghanistan with our forces as we did in Iraq. And if we could commit that level of troops, we shouldn't because of the poor supply lines going into Afghanistan place our military at too much risk of destruction as a fighting force if the supply lines are cut.
I think we have to focus on the gaining the allegiance of the rural tribes of Afghanistan, which are much more powerful than they are in Iraq. Our forces should focus on isolating Afghanistan from external accelerants such as ill-educated paid gunmen, money, and weapons that flow in from Pakistan and to a lesser extent Iran. Not entirely, of course. Some of our forces must support the Afghan army and police as well as friendly tribal local defense forces and local defense forces that we raise. Stiffeners, fire brigades, advisors, and access to fire support, supplies, and medical help will be a force multiplier for the campaign in the interior.
But regardless of how we end up trying to win, encouraging a game of musical chairs in Kabul when Kabul can't be the source of success with even an idealized Obama of Afghanistan in charge is sheer folly.
I find it idiotic enough that our Left cries "Vietnam!" whenever American forces enter combat. I'd be happier if the Left didn't try to ensure this outcome and not just predict it.
