First, with 10,000 quoted as the size of the force massed, I assumed that included support units that would remain in Israel, so only two brigades would be available to go into Gaza. Apparently not, as this article (as an aside, this AP article is well written with a lot of useful informaton) reports that three brigades crossed into Gaza:
Thousands of soldiers in three brigade-size formations pushed into Gaza after nightfall Saturday, beginning a long-awaited ground offensive after a week of intense aerial bombardment.
So three brigades means about 10,000 Israeli troops. Of course, brigade support units could have remained in Israel even as the line elements of the brigades invaded. Which is why I hate numbers of troops in articles. I'd rather know numbers of brigades or whatever. But mass audiences know people and not military units to judge size.
But I digress.
The Israeli troops face about 20,000 Hamas gunmen fighting and hiding among 1.4 million people. This is the battlefield:
Source: http://www.theglobaleducationproject.org/mideast/info/maps/gaza-strip-2003-map.jpg
One drive, which appears to be the main effort, reached the sea, south of Gaza City, cutting it off from the usual supply tunnels into Egypt in the southwest:
An armored force south of Gaza City penetrated as deep as the abandoned settlement of Netzarim, which Israel left along with other Israeli communities when it pulled out of Gaza in 2005, both military officials and Palestinian witnesses said.
That move effectively cut off Gaza City, the territory's largest population center with about 400,000 people, from the rest of the territory to the south.
The Israelis are also fightin northeast of Gaza:
Beit Lahiya was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting.
Another thrust was in the south, which could be the start of an effort to cut off Gaza from the outside through Egypt's Sinai Peninsula:
The offensive focused on northern Gaza, where most of the rockets are fired into Israel, but at least one incursion was reported in the southern part of the strip.
Hamas uses smuggling tunnels along the southern border with Egypt to bring in weapons.
I assume naval and air patrols are watching the sea.
The time frame according to an unnamed senior Israeli officer:
He said the operation was "not a rapid one that would end in hours or a few days."
Still, he said, "We have no intention of staying in the Gaza Strip for the long term."
So weeks, it would seem. Which would indicate an objective of more than just fighting until a ceasefire. This sounds more like defeating the Hamas gunmen and then sifting the population for weapons and leaders and other assets like rocket-making workshops. Breaking up the Gaza strips into pockets would make it easier to comb the areas one by one.
Although the Israeli army has not yet moved into the big urban areas, the Israelis are already demonstrating urban fighting techniques that could nullify Hamas's tactics:
Residents of the small northern Gaza community of al-Attatra said soldiers moved from house to house by blowing holes through walls. Most of the houses were unoccupied, their residents already having fled.
Going through the buildings is a good sign that tactically the Israelis are ready for the fight.
Despite defending their own turf, a fast-moving Israeli operation can still catch Hamas flat-footed with such operations:
Hamas militants fired mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades. Field commanders communicated over walkie talkies, updating gunmen on the location of Israeli forces. Commanders told gunmen in the streets not to gather in groups and not to use cell phones.
In Lebanon in 2006, Israeli troops fought slowly and cautiously and never stressed the Hezbollah plan of fighting in prepared positions along expected lines of advance. If Israeli plans confound Hamas expectations, Hamas will have trouble reacting effectively with their poor command and control relying on walkie talkies.
We shall see if Israel has learned the bigger lessons of the 2006 Hezbollah War by fighting vigorously to win and not just going through the motions of war, hoping for victory to magically emerge. Given Israel's recent track record, I'm skeptical until convinced. But this is shaping up better than it first seemed. The pressure for a ceasefire to save Hamas from defeat is building, but America is still holding firm to buy Israel time:
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon conveyed his "extreme concern and disappointment" to Olmert and called for an immediate end to the operation, according to a U.N. statement Sunday.
Denunciations also came from the French government, which unsuccessfully proposed a two-day truce earlier this week, and from Egypt, which brokered the six-month truce whose breakdown preceded the Israeli offensive.
But the U.S. has put the blame squarely on Hamas. White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said U.S. officials have been in regular contact with the Israelis as well as officials from countries in the region and Europe.
At an emergency consultation of the U.N. Security Council on Saturday night, the U.S. blocked approval of a statement demanded by Arab countries that would have called for an immediate cease-fire.
Israel failed to use the time we bought in 2006.
And we shall see if this remains just the Gaza War of 2008. The Israelis are calling up more reservists than I initially heard of less than 10,000:
Israel also has called up tens of thousands of reserve soldiers, which defense officials said could enable a far broader ground offensive as the operation's third phase. The troops could also be used in the event Palestinian militants in the West Bank or Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon decide to launch attacks. Hezbollah opened a war against Israel in 2006 when it was in the midst of a large operation in Gaza.
Remember, the Hezbollah War of 2006 eclipsed the Gaza War of 2006 that sparked it. And Iran backs Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria.
