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Tuesday, October 07, 2008

Half the Distance to the Goal Line

Iraqi military casualties are rising even as American casualties decline. This is as it should be as Iraqis step up and take over their own defense.

The reductions in American combat casualties in Iraq is most striking, and provides a clearer picture of the reduction in our combat role than total casualties. While non-combat casualties would surely be lower back in the United States for a comparable number of troops living and training at peacetime activities, the fact is we can't reduce our casualties to zero because even without bullets and bombs, people die.

The DOD breaks down American casualties by month and type here. During the major combat operations phase of March and April 2003, we suffered 65.3 killed in action (KIA) and 18.0 noncombat deaths (NCD) per month (counting this period as 1.67 months).

The remainder of 2003 saw rates of 26.3 KIA per month and 17.1 NCD per month.

The year 2004 saw rates of 59.4 KIA and 11.1 NCD. As a subset, January to March 2004 saw rates of 27.3 KIA and 11.7 NCD.

In 2005, we saw rates of 56.1 KIA and 14.3 NCD.

In 2006, we saw rates of 58.7 KIA and 9.7 NCD.

In 2007, we saw rates of 63.7 KIA and 11.6 NCD.

In 2008, we have had rates of 22.4 KIA and 7.4 NCD. This total death toll is a great reduction from past rates from 2004 to 2007 when the various insurgencies and terrorists were at their peaks. The July to September 2008 rates are even better at 9.3 KIA and 11.0 NCD.

I'd mentioned that descriptions of enemy attacks this year declining to levels not seen since spring 2004 understated our progress because in April 2004 we started counting all incidents when prior to that point we only counted enemy attacks that inflicted casualties on our forces. Also, IEDs found are counted as an attack (This is a legitimate way of counting "attacks" but since the enemy quickly came to rely on these weapons, many "attacks" were actually prevented attacks. Since we cannot also count enemy mortar attacks or direct fire ambushes canceled because our forces scared the enemy off, preempted IED attacks are unique in counting when not carried out.). So with a recent count based on all enemy attacks at the same level as only effective enemy attacks back in spring 2004, our situation was much better, I argued.

Comparing our recent three months with the first quarter of 2004, before we switched our statistical measures of attacks, we see that our recent NCD rate is quite similar. It is the KIA rate that shows the real difference, with the 2008 rate being a little more than a third of the 2004 rate. This is the clearest indication that attack statistics before April 2004 can't be compared to those compiled after that change.

Further, even with no KIA in a completely peaceful Iraq, our monthly toll that is averaging under 30 total deaths (KIA plus NCD) per month so far this year likely can't be reduced by more than 2/3 since we'll probably suffer 10 deaths per month just in accidents and sickness. Already in the last 3 months, KIA are running less than NCD.

We are successfully transitioning a responsibility for a winning battle to the Iraqis. In time, Iraqi casualties will decline, too, as the jihadis, Iranian Special Groups, and criminal gangs are defeated by the Iraqis with our decreasing help.

But also keep in mind that there will be a certain level of Iraqi casualties that will be normal to the region just as any large group of Americans will suffer deaths with no fighting taking place. Unfortunately, after decades of Saddam's savage rule and years of jihadi, Baathist, Sadrist, Iranian, and gang warfare after Saddam, we will have difficulty determining what "normal" levels of violence in Iraq are today.

We will never get to zero casualties. But that does not mean we aren't winning.

UPDATE: Strategypage writes about the plague of corruption and violence that provides a floor to violence levels in Iraq:

Throughout the Moslem world, lawlessness and crime are a major complaint. Both are controlled, if at all, via police state tactics. This provides peace, but not justice. Thus the anger remains. In Iraq, the police are now concentrating on the criminals, but often doing so using traditional methods. Put simply, the cops just go out and round up anyone they think is criminal, or they just don't like. Many innocent people suffer. This approach leaves peace, and anger, in its wake. The Iraqis see it as an improvement, but not a tolerable state of affairs.


Which is why democracy and rule of law in Iraq must follow the military victories over al Qaeda, the Baathists, Sunni nationalists, and Shia thugs (some backed by Iran). We must not walk away from Iraq. We've achieved much already but our victory could be broader and more significant if we stay involved in Iraq for years and decades to come.