This article says the Georgian army broke and ran in the war. Which is consistent with reports that showed Russians moving at will inside Georgia, seemingly poised to drive on the capital, after the first week with hardly a Georgian army unit in sight.
Consider the relatively heavy Russian casualties endured by a small 12,000-man force (about a division) in such a short time--about 64 KIA, according to Moscow, in 5 days of fighting (13 KIA per day) against a Georgian military that had no more than 40,000 total. Compare this to 173 American and British casualties in five division equivalents during 43 days of major combat operations (4 KIA per day) against Saddam's military of 400,000. It says little for the Russian military's capabilities to realize that their casualties were inflicted by an enemy that broke and ran.
And the reason the Russians didn't advance all the way to Tbilisi may have been that too many Russian vehicles broke down along the way:
Russia's military, while able to overpower and scare off the inexperienced Georgian Army, went into battle with aging equipment, including scores of tanks designed in the 1960s, and armored vehicles that broke down in large numbers along Georgia's roads.
I eagerly await a more complete and professional analysis of the Russian invasion.
Why did the Russians stop before taking Tbilisi?
