All we know for sure right now is that Russia has declared they are not our strategic partner. Yet they may one day be a critical partner for containing China. Russia is the Angry Sick Man of Europe. We must prop them up even as we contain them. This is a delicate mission, to say the least.
Arthur K., who is in no mood to coddle the Russians, sent me the link to this article by Spengler arguing that Russia's demographics mean they need to absorb the Russians in the so-called near abroad to keep from entering a death spiral of population decline. So Spengler says me must make a deal with Moscow since Russia will do what it takes to kidnap those ethnic Russians:
My proposal is simple: Russia's help in containing nuclear proliferation and terrorism in the Middle East is of infinitely greater import to the West than the dubious self-determination of Ukraine. The West should do its best to pretend that the "Orange" revolution of 2004 and 2005 never happened, and secure Russia's assistance in the Iranian nuclear issue as well as energy security in return for an understanding of Russia's existential requirements in the near abroad. Anyone who thinks this sounds cynical should spend a week in Kiev.
Russia has more to fear from a nuclear-armed Iran than the United States, for an aggressive Muslim state on its borders could ruin its attempt to Russify Central Asia.
Even if there was evidence that those Russians abroad are reproducing faster than Russians inside Russia, this would be a bad idea to accept.
First, if Russians would only regain faith in the future, maybe Russians in Russia would reverse the demographic crash. And if Russia embarks on a couple generations of war to reclaim declining ethnic Russians abroad, where will faith in the future come from? And when Russia runs out of declining Russians to stave of collapse, won't they just move on to any Slavs? And then any Europeans or Asians? I'm just not convinced when I'm told that at Point A, Moscow will have no more territorial ambitions.
Also, I recall in the early 1980s reading a French author's study of Russification under the Soviet Union (Yes, it was as dull as it sounds. But well argued and documented. Oddly, a preppy Soviet (He really tied a sweater around his neck!) was rather upset when he saw me reading it in the video arcade I worked in. Luckily for me, he did not remember me when he became my TA for my last year of Russian language classes! And he sublet in my fraternity that summer to round out the oddness.) when it still ruled the near abroad. It was called Decline of an Empire. That study did not paint a good picture of the future of Russification in any non-Russian area other than Moldavia. What makes anyone think that the Russians would have better luck in the future if they reconquer their near abroad that has lived independent for a generation already?
Besides, why would we abandon our soft power appeal to the oppressed in various autocracies for the false appeal of appeasing the paranoid Russians? Who would trust that we would defend them if they rise up if we abandon the Ukrainians for Russian aid with Iran?
And if anyone thinks that it is wise to count on Russian help for energy security, spend a week during the winter in Berlin.
Ultimately, however, the very concept of realpolitik argues against a deal that trades our abandonment of Ukraine to the tender mercies of dismemberment by Moscow for Moscow's help in keeping Iran from getting atomic weapons. This is an inherently unbalanced deal. Consider that keeping Iran from getting atomic weapons is by definition an ongoing operation. As long as the mullahs want nukes, we'd have to work to stop them. But once Moscow seizes eastern Ukraine to absorb ethnic Russians, the deed is done. If we made the trade, what would stop the Russians from demanding our agreement to the despoiling of yet another country for continued help in keeping Iran from going nuclear? Where would the blackmail stop?
Besdies, if keeping Iran from going nuclear is more in Russia's interest than ours, why would we trade anything of importance to get the Russians to do what they should do anyway? If we must hand over Ukraine to get Russia to do something they should want to do anyway, what would we have to give up to get the Russians to concede something they hold dear?
Spengler's solution is both simple and simply awful. We are faced with the Angry Sick Man of Europe. Which means we must both stop their aggression and keep them from declining lest China sweep into the vaccum of Russia's total collapse. This is no problem solvable with a silver bullet of a single betrayal of a nation and our values.
We must contain the aggressive Russians and support the reasonable ones until the time comes when Russians are no longer paranoid about the West and self-destructive in their drive to regain their anti-Western Soviet glory days at the expense of their future as the frontline of the West.
