Robert Kagan has a useful history of European alienation from America. It did not begin with George W. Bush:
Hard as it may be to recall, the United States' problems with the world -- or, rather, the world's problems with the United States -- started before George W. Bush took office. French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine complained about the "hyperpower" in 1998. In 1999, Samuel Huntington argued in these pages that much of the world saw the Unites States as a "rogue superpower," "intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical."Although Huntington and others blamed the Clinton administration's constant boasting about "American power and American virtue," the Clintonites did not invent American self-righteousness. The source of the problem was the geopolitical shift that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subtle psychological effects of this shift on the way the United States and other powers perceived themselves and one another. By the late 1990s, talk of a crisis in transatlantic relations had already begun, and despite all the finger-pointing, the underlying cause was simple: the allies did not need one another as much as before. The impulse to cooperate during the Cold War had been one part enlightened virtue and three parts cold necessity. Mutual dependence, not mutual affection, had been the bedrock of the alliance. When the Soviet threat disappeared, the two sides were free to go their own ways.
It was clear to me much earlier than the late 1990s. I take some pride in that when I taught introductory American history in 1990-1992, I saw this divide coming. When I discussed the period between the French and Indian War (Seven Years War to you Europeans) and the American Revolution, I noted that we would probably see Europe and America recreate the diverging paths that America and Britain, respectively, followed back then. When America did not need Britain's protection from the French hordes across the Appalachian Mountains, we balked at paying for a common defense. Britain wanted financial help and their stubborness drove us away.
Europe today, too, without Soviet Tanks idling at the Fulda Gap, saw no need to maintain close defense relations with America. 9/11 did not change that differing view of threats. Unlike Britain, we have not made the mistake of trying to force the Europeans to remain our military allies. We cajole and persuade--but never try to force them with intolerable demands. And our alliance has lasted even as it teetered looking for a reason to exist. It is natural that the Europeans would seek distance from us since our problem is not their problem.
Hey, as long as we are arguing for some perspective, why stop with the last twenty years? Never forget that our current problems with Europe are not just our fault, of course. But also remember that in the sweep of history, our problems with today's European allies are nothing compared to our past problems that included wars against Britain, France, Spain, Italy, and Germany (twice).
I would, however, like to take exception to Kaplan's description of our war efforts in Iraq as four years of failure followed by the surge which won the war. We needed the surge for the new phase of the war we found ourselves in, but we built the foundation for the surge's success with success in prior phases of the war against different enemies.
