The Few, The Cowed, the Mahdi Army

Our press always seems to peg the Mahdi Army at 60,000 fighters when they write stories about Sadr. I've often commented that I think this number is pure fantasy. Perhaps, this refers to total supporters, but it always seemed ludicrous to me to speak of 60,000 fighters as if there were 60,000 in the streets ready to do battle.

Strategypage pegs these guys at a more reasonable number:

Eight weeks of fighting have caused the Mahdi Army over 4,000 casualties (dead, wounded, captured, deserted). For an outfit estimated to have a peak strength of 6,000, that's some pretty serious losses. The Mahdi Army can quickly recruit new gunmen. Nearly every family has at least one firearm. But the new recruits are green, and die easily in combat, if they don't run and hide when the shooting starts. So the Mahdi Army has a manpower shortage.

Having 54,000 supporters would make it easier to replace losses, of course, as any force will do. But the losses no doubt make recruiting tougher and make the recruits who do show up both less effective and less eager to die in lopsided fights with Iraqi and American troops. This mighty horde has run away in both Basra and Baghdad's Sadr City as well as points in between when confronted with Iraqi and American forces determined to win.

But as long as the Mahdi Army press spokesman can talk a mean game of jihad, with suitable eye-bulging threats and an AK-47 in hand, our press will continue to write about the mighty Mahdi "Army" even when they can't field enough men for a soccer league.