The officials said the mutiny involved a full infantry battalion belonging to the 4th Iraqi Division numbering about 500 men and some 400 policemen. The deserters also turned over to the Mahdi militia some of their weapons and vehicles, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.
We're talking 3% of the total. Obviously, it would have been better to have zero failures. But 97% reliability isn't too bad, either, for fairly green troops led by green officers against enemies who may have numbered as many as 15,000, according to press reports (which I don't trust. I suspect the number is over-stated).
We are used to modern American units fighting firmly, but historically it is routine for units--even American units--to break and run in battle. Or even defect, as some American soldiers did in the Mexican War or that one soldier in the 101st Airborne Division did at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom when he tossed a grenade in one of the division's command posts.
That's why you'll see reports of leaders rallying a broken unit to lead back into battle or military police units behind the lines rounding up scattered small units and individuals to send them back to the front. Stuff happens. Soldiers are human and get scared. And sometimes fear overcomes training.
Remember, too, that we don't know how many Sadrists refused to come out or who ran in battle. They don't document their failures and the press could hardly find this out. I think it is safe to assume that the Sadrists failure rate was far higher than the Iraqi government security forces' failure rate. Unless you want to argue that the Sadrists are immune to the normal reactions to the stress of combat.
Further, the fact that over half the total were in one army battalion speaks of command failure rather than soldier failure. Had the relatively few officers been up to the task, they would have led their soldiers into battle successfully. Put new officers in charge and that same battalion might be tough as nails in the next battle they fight.
The police may have been ill-prepared for the tougher resistance they faced. They are police, remember, and not soldiers who could be expected to be able to attack and maneuver. It may have been a higher leadership problem here, too, in using police units beyond their capabilities. Even good police units could collapse if inappropriately used as army troops. Or, they may have had too many Sadr sympathizers. This will be an issue to investigate and correct.
This story was on the bad side of the ledger for Iraq. But I don't see enough bad to outweigh the good so far. And again, this is part of a longer campaign that has yet to be won or lost. Either my instant reaction or the conventional wisdom (it made it to NPR yesterday in their "reporting") is premature at this point.
I'm still betting on my reaction. Round Three was an incomplete Iraqi victory and a setback for Sadr and the Iranians. And the campaign will go on.
UPDATE: Strategypage describes the week of combat. You won't recognize this account if all you know is what you read in the papers. Why you still read the papers alone after years of their failures is beyond me and beyond the scope of my blog.
Of particular interest is the Iraqi battalion failure in context:
The Mahdi army lost 571 killed, 881 wounded, 490 captured, and 30 surrendered, in a week of fighting. The army and police lost over 500 to desertions, which is a much lower percentage of these losses than in previous operations. One of the army brigades had only recently finished training. To everyone's surprise, the brigade did not fall apart. The Mahdi army lost far more in terms of neighborhoods controlled, weapons, vehicles and popular support.
The Iraqis should never have sent that green brigade into combat.
