Moqtada al Sadr, the two-time insurrectionist whose followers were killed in large numbers in 2004 without alienating a majority of the Shias, is in Iran going to school and is on the path to becoming an ayatollah. The question is will he return with his degree and Iranian support to lead a third revolt?
Traditionally, no man under 40 could pretend to be a "Proof of Islam," for it was at 40 that the Prophet Muhammad was approached by Archangel Gabriel and informed of his divine mission.
But the "Muqtada Project" envisages shortcuts. Sadr is to complete the 12-year course in four or five years, by which time he'd also be 40. Someone could write a resaleh for him and someone else could attest to the work's authority. He could then receive endorsement (tasdiq) from ayatollahs close to the Tehran authorities.
Sometime in 2012 or so, we may meet Ayatollah al-Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr al-Mahallati al-Tabatabai. By then, Najaf's four aging grand ayatollahs could have passed on, thus making it easier for Tehran to market Muqtada as a religious authority for Iraqis.
To win control of Iraq after the Americans leave, Iran needs to control Najaf. But none of the senior clerics there now is prepared to accept the authority of Iranian "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenei (himself the product of a similar political project for manufacturing an ayatollah). So Muqtada's makeover is of vital importance to Iran's strategy in Iraq.
Yet that plan faces other problems. The US may not run away after all. And Sadr's followers may not wait until he has finished his makeover. Several influential mullahs are already calling for the Mahdi Army to end its self-declared cease-fire and resume killing Sunnis and attacking Americans.Indeed, Sadr's movement is growing fragmented and marginalized. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has all but excluded the Sadrists from his coalition, and is determined not to let them make a splash in the coming municipal elections.
Despite Tehran's largesse, the Mahdi Army can't meet its costs without its usual criminal activities, including oil smuggling, hostage-taking and dipping hands into the government cookie jar.
Muqtada faces a tough choice. Should he continue with the Iranian project, in hopes of winning big in four or five years - at the risk that others will fill the vacuum in his absence? Or interrupt the Iranian project and return to Iraq to reactivate his armed gangs - possibly exposing himself to the Americans' full fire - which, with Sunni pressure almost gone, could crush him?
Sadr's best bet would be to distance himself from Tehran and return to Iraq to lead his faction with full respect for the new constitution and the principle of changing policies and governments via elections, rather than armed action.
A year ago, I worried that Sadr might be able to lead enough Shias to become a military threat to the Iraqi government. But his forces have fragmented. Only a minority were really killers and only some of them looked to Iran for leadership. The rest were just interested in defending their neighborhoods against jihadi suicide bombers.
While Sadr should be in jail or executed for his past, he has too many admirers. Yet while I do not look forward to his return to Iraqi politics in 2012, Sadr may find that his followers are no longer willing to fight against a democratically elected Iraqi government.
And if his pro-Iranian nominal supporters decide to try arms in the next couple years, these thugs will find they can be hit by the Iraqi government more easily without Sadr as their leader able to attract other Shias to his banner.
Right now Sadr has too little to threaten the government. In 2012, it may be too late to threaten the government with extra-legal methods. He could become someone with a fanatical following no more annoying than a Doctor Ron Paul or Reverend Al Sharpton.
In the end, maybe that will hurt Mookie more than jail or execution.
