In our latest phase in the surge, we've taken apart al Qaeda to a large degree and blunted the Sadrist drive to use Iranian support to target the government. The reason we had to employ the surge was that the past strategy became obsolete in the face of the evolving and adapting enemy--and not because we were losing the war up until the point we adopted the surge. Major General Lynch explains:
Two years ago, U.S. forces thought the best way to help Iraq was to hand over the country as soon as possible, he said in an Associated Press interview. From 2005-2006 Lynch was in charge of communications and convincing Sunni leaders to support the new government.
"When we were doing all of our planning back then, we were convinced we could have a gradual withdrawal of coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces would stand up," the general said at the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division in Baghdad on Friday.
Then came the February 2006 destruction of the Golden Mosque, a site revered by Shiites, which set off weeks of horrific sectarian violence. Two suicide bombers killed 99 people in Baghdad on Friday, but there was no indication the attacks were connected to the anniversary of the mosque attack, observed on Friday.
"Everything changed," Lynch said. "The mission changed from transition to securing the population."
Remember that just prior to the Golden Mosque bombing, we'd blunted the Baathists, al Qaeda, and Sadrists in their efforts to rise up and defeat the government. All these forces still killed innocents, but with expanding Iraqi security forces and the desire of the Iraqi government to treat Sadr as a political problem, it looked like our military tasks were done. However long it took, the Iraqis would be able to handle the remaining threats with our help mostly in combat support and logistics roles rather than combat. We were starting to pull back from routine combat and preparing to draw down combat brigades.
The Golden Dome bombing in February 2006 changed everything. Sadrists and jihadis killed civilians to provoke a civil war and we failed to pacify Baghdad in the latter part of 2006 under the old rules. If the effect of this violence wasn't the splintering of our will to fight, this would have been tragic but irrelevant to the outcome of the war. This killing was not aimed at seizing the government but at ending our support for the government. Once weakened without our support, Iraq might have splintered, leaving al Qaeda in control of a portion of Iraq and entrenched in Baghdad to keep killing Shias. And al Qaeda would have boasted of driving America from Iraq. We could not afford that result. Hence the surge, which adapted to the new situation and beat back the latest enemy attempt to defeat America.
It is possible the enemies in Iraq will adapt again and present a new challenge that we will have to face. But do remember that the killing that took place at such horrific levels in the latter half of 2006 and the first half of 2007 were the result of an enemy strategy that hoped to reverse their losses. They adapted. If they do so again, our job is to adapt again and push forward to victory. As time goes on, Iraq gets stronger and will require less of our help to meet future adaptations by the enemies.
And eventually, the enemies will simply falter and give up in defeat.
