The danger of war between the U.S. and Iran over free passage in the Straits is very real. Iranian authorities may not fully understand the political and military consequences of such raids. The commanders of the maritime forces of the Revolutionary Guard, by all accounts less professional than the commanders of Iran's regular navy, may be operating without central authority, and may have underestimated the likelihood and the scale of the probable U.S. response. Believing that retaliation would be minor and half-hearted, they may even be seeking a limited confrontation with the U.S. for domestic political reasons.
Last weekend, the Iranians fled before shots were fired. Good for them. If Iran wants a large-scale military conflict with a U.S. that is angry, aroused and united, endangering American naval vessels in the Straits of Hormuz is the right way to get one.
Mead rightly notes that we are a naval power so we take naval incidents seriously. And of course, as a naval power, we obviously have more opportunities for our ships to tangle with hostile nations than countries like Mongolia. What is puzzling to me is that in all his examples, Mead doesn't mention the undeclared US-Iran naval war in the Gulf in 1987-1988 during the Tanker War of the Iran-Iraq War:
The most dramatic and visible part of this stage of the war took place in the Gulf and in the strategic arena. This stage was further characterized by the Americanization of the war. The signal event was the Iraqi Exocet attack on the U.S.S. Stark on May 17, 1987 (the Soviet Union too, it should be mentioned, suffered losses in May--the tanker Marshal Chuykov struck a mine and the freighter Ivan Karotyev was hit by the Iranians). The attack was termed an accident by both sides, yet the crippling of an American warship sent America into the Gulf in strength. Washington's decision dragged in a reluctant Western Europe that grudgingly accepted that Iran would not remain quiet in the face of Iraqi provocation. Further incentive to American intervention was Kuwait's overtures to Moscow for help against Iran's campaign against neutral shipping. America scrambled to keep the Gulf an American lake by granting Kuwait's request to reflag Kuwaiti tankers under the Stars and Stripes and took steps to organize the defense of those tankers through the Iranian gauntlet. Iran responded to the development with bluster, claiming to have formed a potent force called "Seekers of Martyrdom in the Persian Gulf." Observers in the West questioned the ability of the United States Navy to handle threats ranging from massive Silkworm missiles and a surge of Iranian aircraft to mines and tiny speedboats manned by fanatics and equipped with rocket propelled grenades or packed with explosives. American training and equipment had focused on a conventional battle with the Soviet fleet in the North Atlantic and not a seaborne guerrilla war after all.
On July 24, 1987, the newly reflagged and heavily guarded tanker Bridgeton struck a mine in the northern Gulf in an apparent vindication of critics who had questioned American intervention. Iranians gloated but refrained from taking credit for the mining. The mishap galvanized the West rather than scare it into retreat. By September 1987, 70 Western warships patrolled the Gulf. Iran was under no delusions as to where the armada's guns were pointed. Despite theoretical neutrality given that the fleet would defend its charges against any attackers, Iran was the only country interested in attacking the tankers of Iraq's de facto Gulf allies.
The first American-Iranian clash took place on September 21, 1987, when American forces discovered Iran Ajr laying mines 128 kilometers northeast of Bahrain. A helicopter strike disabled the ship and allowed U.S. landing teams to capture the vessel. Despite Iranian protests that the ship was carrying food and not mines, America had caught Tehran red handed and scuttled the Iranian ship in deep water. ...
The frustration of failing to crush Iraq, of witnessing America lead the West into the Gulf in force, of enduring air attacks against her oil lifeline, and of seeing the militarily weak but wealth Arab Gulf states funnel money to prop up Iraq's military pushed Iran to the brink of irrationality. When Iraq was the country that had invaded Iran in the first place back in 1980 this seemed too unjust and proof that the world was against their revolution. On top of this, Iran received no sympathy when, in July, Saudi security forces bloodily suppressed Iranian "pilgrims" after they tried to mobilize a pro-Iranian demonstration in the heart of Saudi Arabia. On October 3, 1987, Iran crossed the line into irrationality. Unable to defeat her one enemy Iraq, Iran massed between 30 and 50 speedboats for an attack on Saudi Arabia's off-shore oil terminal at Khafji--the one used by the Kuwaitis and Saudis to sell oil in Iraq's name. Saudi Arabia responded by deploying warships and fighter aircraft. Iran pulled back but five days later in another confrontation the Saudis sank three speedboats.
Iran, apparently not satisfied with defeat at the hands of Iraq and then Saudi Arabia, even struck an American flagged tanker, Sea Isle City, with a Silkworm missile while it lay in Kuwaiti waters. The United States retaliated with Operation Nimble Archer on October 19, 1987, during which three Iranian oil platform bases were attacked. Many Iranians knew that a course of confrontation with America was foolish but the short term satisfaction of striking out at those who helped Iraq--even the United States--was beginning to win out over reason. ...
At the same time that Iran was losing on the ground, Iran's navy sailed on its death ride. The naval battle was prompted by the mining of U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts on April 14, 1988 in the first mine incident since November 1987. Five days later, America responded with Operation Praying Mantis. Designed as a proportional response to the damaged U.S. frigate, the operation involved the destruction of two Iranian oil platform bases. The Sassan platform was demolished by a Marine landing team while the Sirri platform was destroyed by naval gunfire. During this operation, an Iranian patrol boat was sunk and F-4 Phantom fighter bombers were driven off by American surface to air missile fire. Iran's response set off a chain of events that left perhaps three of her patrol boats at the bottom of the Gulf and two modern frigates smashed. American forces dodged more Iranian attacks including the impressive evasion of five Silkworms by Jack Williams. The Only American loss, a Sea Cobra attack helicopter, was lost by accident and not hostile action. ...
Despite Iraq's repeated small losses in Kurdistan, her victories on the rest of the front were coming at such a rapid pace that Iran was near collapse. In the atmosphere of this pending disaster (increasingly apparent even to Iran's leaders), a tragedy in the Gulf weighed in with possibly decisive consequences on the mind of the Ayatollah Khomeini. On July 3, 1988, in the midst of a confusing clash with Iranian forces in the congested Strait of Hormuz, the American cruiser Vincennes mistakenly shot down an Iranian Airbus 300 that entered the combat area. All 290 aboard were killed. Khomeini tried to use this incident to whip up renewed anger against Iraq, but the Iranian ground forces were too far gone to rise to the challenge. The combination of Iraqi battlefield dominance and Tehran's perception that America was willing to stop at nothing to crush Iran led the Ayatollah Khomeini to accept U. N. Resolution No. 598, which called for an end to the war. On July 16, 1988, Iran formally accepted the resolution.
So we've been there before. We managed to keep conflict at sea restricted to the Gulf without epxanding to a general war. And I'd like to add that while Khomeini tried to whip up public enthusiasm for the war using the last incident, he failed. Iranians were in no mood to fight America.
A limited response to the next Iranian provocation could teach the fanatics a lesson, protect our ships from a future surprise attack, and maybe even backfire on Ahmadinejad as much as round one failed to help Khomeini. Remember, just because our enemies are convinced that a conflict with America will rally their people to the regime doesn't mean our enemies are correct in that assumption.
