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Wednesday, January 09, 2008

Phantom Forces

Except for brief periods in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 and the aftermath of the spring 2004 Sadr-Sunni offensive, I've held we've had plenty of troops to win the war. And even at those low points of troop strength, the enemy was unable to drive us from Iraq.

Yet critics were so certain that we had too few that even 30,000 surge troops was deemed too little to make a difference. (And indeed, how we used the troops has been more important than the numbers.) Yet this troop density analysis always ignored non-US forces and never counted even all of the Iraqi forces.

Today, as we see accumulating victory during the surge despite never having enought troops (according to the critics), let's look at the numbers and the missions.

This article on our current Phantom Phoenix offensive states:

"We're attempting to increase the tempo of operations in that specific province," Hertling said. "There are more U.S. and Iraqi security forces in Diyala now than there ever has been."


I've noted that success against the enemy will allow us to have local surges even as our troop strength in Iraq drops as our surge of US troops runs its course. Remember that during the surge, Iraq added more troops to their forces than we added:

Iraqis are turning on the various enemies as they see Iraqi and US forces chasing the enemy. Further, even as Iraqi forces get more numerous and better trained and equipped, we have successfully addressed the other side of the equation by atomizing the enemy and increasing the Iraqi security forces' advantages over the enemies. It has taken time to get here, but we seem to have finally made it with different trends finally converging.

A benefit of our broad success across many areas in Iraq that has reduced enemy attacks dramatically is that even as we reduce overall US troop strength in Iraq, we can still add troops to areas that are troublesome. So we can still remain on offense and pursue the enemy.



As of November 2007, Iraq's Ministry of Interior has over 343,000 people (242,000 trained) plus 19,000 Facility Protection Service guards. The Ministry of Defense has 208,000 (194,000 trained). And there are 4,000 counter-terrorism forces (3,500 trained). This is a total of 574,000 (469,000 trained).

Add 70,000 mostly Sunni Arab Concerned Local Citizens in local defense forces and 70,000 Pesh Merga local defense forces the Kurdish region. Then add American troops dropping to 130,000 by summer 2008. Perhaps 10,000 Coalition and 10,000 contract security (I'm going on memory for these).

We're talking over 840,000 security personnel right now (really 870,000 since surge forces are just starting to leave).

Been awhile since anyone talked about too few troops, eh?