The bulk of the additional forces, approximately 2,200, will be provided by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. In March the MEU will deploy to southern Afghanistan, where they will be under the command of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, or as we call them, ISAF. The deployment, which will last about seven months, fills a long-standing ISAF request for a maneuver force in Regional Command South. There the MEU will conduct full-spectrum combat operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda so as to provide the Afghan people with a safe and secure environment in which to rebuild their lives.
A Marine battalion consisting of roughly a thousand troops will also deploy to Afghanistan in April but under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom. That battalion will focus exclusively on the training and development of the Afghan national security forces. With the help of those additional trainers, the Afghan government will be able to accelerate the development of its security forces, which are already assuming the lead in many security operations.
The MEU is a combined arms unit based on a rifle battalion and including armor, artillery, and an air element of helicopters and possibly aircraft. It will be involved in going after the Taliban to make spring once again a time for our offensive and not the enemy's. The separate battalion will be broken up into training teams. I has assumed the two units would operate together as a small brigade, but that's not how it will work.
I guess NATO couldn't scrape up a deployable battalion out of all their hundreds of thousands of soldiers under arms. Which is probably just as well. Soft power doesn't cut it out at the sharp tip of the spear.
UPDATE: The Washington Post agrees the Marines are going because NATO can't find the troops. But their conclusion is rather amusing:
It nevertheless is a good thing that Marines rather than European soldiers will deploy in Helmand province this spring to head off any Taliban offensive. Defeating the Afghan insurgency will require the United States to take on a larger part of the fighting. Success will also require U.S. commanders to insist that a more coherent, nationwide counterinsurgency strategy be pursued -- including aggressive training of the Afghan army and police, economic development that is centrally coordinated, and a focused attack on the opium business that supplies most of the Taliban's funding. If that means downgrading NATO's role or bruising the feelings of some allied governments, so be it.
What? Having the blessing of many allies doesn't lead to victory? Having allies with us isn't intrinsically a good thing? We should carry out a comperehensive counter-insurgency strategy like "the surge" in Iraq? Americans should fight without allied troops who aren't as good? We should bruise the feelings of our allies by fighting without their participation?
It's like a NeoCon revivial on the Potomic.
